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A Note on Terminology
I have attempted, as far as possible, to spell appropriately indigenous groups (such as 
amaXhosa and baTswana, for example), but where I have stepped out of line with more 
thoughtful and modern conventions, I extend my apologies.  Khoekhoe is becoming as 
popular as  Khoikhoi in recent times, and is perhaps more phonetically correct, so it is 
here preferred over Khoikhoi, and certainly over the pejorative Hottentot. San here refers 
to those hunter-gatherers who were called  Bushmen. I sparingly use  Khoe-San in this 
paper, and only do so when convenience permits their similar experiences to be seen 
singularly.
The terms  Coloured and  Black are  problematic  because they extend from  apartheid 
classifications  that  are  still  in  use  today.  Who  were  these  individuals,  and  to  what 
ethnicities do such labels translate? It is impossible for outsiders to know this with any 
certainty  today  let  alone  in  the  past;  and,  according  to  many scholars  from several 
disciplines committed to a post-racialist sociology, it is a job offensively anachronistic to 
try. I have most problems with the homogenising Coloured label, which subsumed into it 
all South Africans of mixed-descent, including those descendants of slaves brought to 
the Cape from around the world, and to make matters really difficult, most Khoe-San. 
White is  a  not  so  complicated  but  equally  confused.  While  tempting  to  reflect  the 
constructedness of these categories with inverted commas, I would not want to patronise 
those identifying as White, Black or Coloured (or a portion of each!), in South Africa 
today. I have also tried to be careful when using  Afrikaner, particularly as a noun, for 
this is no homogenous label either, as I explore later in the study. 
Seldom do I differentiate between those trekboere (or Emigrant Farmers, as they were 
called by the British), on one hand, and those voortrekkers of the Great Trek (the more 
republican type of Boer) on the other hand. From the indigenous point of view, if we 
may be so audacious to see the matter from it, the distinction was unnecessary. Both 
were Boers; like their English brethren committed to staying in South Africa, they were 
a community of white settlers. Some South Africanists will disagree with my use of term 
settler for all those who moved from elsewhere in the world to remain behind – the term 
tends to be reserved for the much-romanticised ‘1820 Settlers’ from Britain – but, again, 
when  seen  from the  indigenous  perspective,  what  need  is  there  for  making  such  a 
distinction?  Settler  colonisers  were  settler  colonisers,  no  matter  what  language  they 
spoke or from which boat they disembarked. 
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There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections 
of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right  
of any other individual in the universe. And yet there are very few that will give 
themselves the trouble to consider the original and foundation of this right. Pleased as 
we are with the possession, we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it was 
acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title; or at least we rest satisfied with the 
decision of the laws in our favour, without examining the reason or authority upon 
which those laws have been built.
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1766).
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1.
INTRODUCTION:
LAND, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INDIGENEITY IN THE HISTORY OF 
SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLER COLONIALISM.
In 1991, a small town on the middle Orange River was suddenly transformed into a 
separatist  and  exclusivist  Afrikaner  polity.  Its  former  inhabitants  were  re-settled 
elsewhere, in a process that should sound familiar to scholars of South Africa and settler 
colonialism. This new polity at Orania was established, so the settlers claimed, in order 
to protect a culture and language under threat in a changing South Africa. They would 
eventually come to argue for a right to self-determination, inspired by the discourse of 
international law and, later, the terms of the new Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa.1
This is an intriguing development in South Africa’s tumultuous history. But it is not 
without  its  historical  precedents.  For  hundreds  of  years  this  particular  region  –  the 
middle  Orange River  valley – has  been  a  meeting  place  for  individuals  from many 
political affiliations: a terrain where several formidable polities emerged, and settled in 
(if albeit sometimes temporarily). An example here is the Griqua state. Initially an odds-
and-ends community of multiply affiliated individuals, the Griqua people transformed 
themselves into a number of key polities in the early nineteenth century, each exhibiting 
its own sovereign capacity. Of these polities, Philippolis – established at an old London 
1 See,  for  instance,  D.  J.  Jooste,  Afrikaner  Claims  to  Self-Determination:  Reasons,  
Validity, and Feasibility (Pretoria: Technikon Pretoria/Freedom Front, 2002). (Author’s 
copy proudly ‘Gekoop in Orania’.)
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Missionary  Society  station  in  1826  –  was  perhaps  the  most  formidable.  Few  rival 
communities, be they BaSotho, BaTswana, Boer, Khoekhoe, San, or any other hybrid 
formation, could escape its dominance of the valley and lands to the north during the 
1820s and 1830s.
Afrikaner  Orania  and  Griqua  Philippolis,  for  all  their  differences,  are  the  two  case 
studies I will compare in this thesis. I examine them with a focus upon the intersection 
of history and law, though I do so somewhat differently to scholars with similar concerns 
before me.  What I aim to do here is use property – specifically, property in land – as a 
means to understand sovereignty and the question of rights in the South African past and 
present, and, in doing so, I present my argument in the context of larger transnational 
debates about land rights and settler colonialism.
Property in this study refers not so much to any codified or universal practice, but rather 
to  a  socio-legal  understanding of  things  possessed.  Specifically, when I  move on to 
describe  the property relations  operative within the  ‘land regimes’ developed by the 
Griqua and the Afrikaners, I am referring to those laws or institutions, whether written or 
unwritten,  pertaining to property in land.  These can regulate any number of matters, 
among them who can alienate land and who can acquire it, the extent to which one owns 
that land, how cognisable the tenure is to outsiders, and how social and political order is 
built upon these foundations. 
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My eyes were opened to the causes that we sometimes forget lie behind property by an 
extensive article by Robert C. Ellickson in the  Yale Law Journal. Instead of accepting 
property as a fait accompli, he analyses the ways in which land institutions have evolved 
across the world to lead us into our present-day understandings of ‘property in land’. 
Calling upon a number of case studies from recent human history, Ellickson makes the 
general claim that social groups with common interests have often united to create their 
own ‘land regimes’ – ‘amalgams of law and custom’ – specific to their own contexts, 
tending  to  be  drastically  different  from  each  other  save  for  a  universal  underlying 
connection between humans and place.2 It is from this angle that he suggests we see a 
plurality of meanings and interests that lie underneath ‘property’ today (a proposition 
that  indeed supports  but  goes far  further beyond the claim that  property is a ‘social 
construction’).3 Griqua  Philippolis  and  Afrikaner  Orania  integrate  into  Ellickson’s 
framework satisfactorily; that these two polities, for all their differences, are situated 
within the same geographical space, has methodological implications too, for potentially 
there are countless other local histories of human occupation across the world that might 
allow us to disentangle what makes up the wider, global corpus of ‘property’ we take for 
granted.
Moving beyond Ellickson’s scope, what I am also interested to provide in this study is a 
discussion of what makes some land regimes last and others crumble, how some rights 
to land are honoured and yet others are disregarded. I argue that sovereignty decides this, 
2 Robert C. Ellickson, ‘Property in Land’, Yale Law Journal 102 (1992-1993), p. 1319.
3 Ellickson, ‘Property in Land’, pp. 1397-8.
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and to that end I show how both Philippolis and Orania participate in, and are dependent 
upon the larger sovereign orders to which they belong. The meaning of ‘sovereignty’ is 
highly contested among scholars from many fields these days, so it will be important 
here to clarify what is meant by it. ‘Property’ and ‘sovereignty’ – however they may be 
considered  co-dependent  or  even  symbiotic  constructions  –  are  discrete  categories, 
which ought not be confused. 
A sound  clarification  of  the  distinction  between  them appears  in  John  C.  Weaver’s 
comparative study The Great Land Rush, an analysis of the advance of settlers onto the 
lands belonging to other peoples, in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, and 
the United States. As he puts it,
Property  interests  pertain  to  private  law,  and  its  subject  matter  is  interests; 
sovereignty,  in  contrast,  relates  to  public  law,  and  its  subject  matter  is  the 
arrogation of power to make rules. Sovereignty became one culture’s mechanism 
for perfecting the conquest of another culture. Sovereignty permitted acts that 
defined and enforced property rights and authorised the decrees, ordinances, and 
statutes  that  helped  pry  first  peoples  loose  from  their  interests  in  land  by 
curtailing their ability to do with a territory whatever they pleased. 4
4 John C. Weaver,  The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-
1900  (Montreal  and  Kingston:  McGill-Queens  University  Press,  2003),  p.  139. 
Emphasis in original.
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The notions of ‘public law’ and ‘private law’, for all their help in placing property into a 
juridical context, speak not to an open frontier scenario but rather to a more modern 
conceptualisation of sovereignty as something that is vested in the nation-state, maker 
and keeper of laws. I do not want to suggest that Weaver misunderstands this. The ‘one 
culture’ to which he is referring in his brilliant book is that crafted by settlers. It would 
be  the  settler  state  regimes  that  ‘monopolized  sovereignty’ towards  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth century, circumscribing severely the rights of those few remaining groups of 
indigenous peoples whose rights to land had not yet entirely been erased by that time.5 
However,  before  this  key  development  –  namely,  the  rise  of  the  settler  states  – 
sovereignty  on frontiers  tended to  be a  little  less  clear-cut  than  this.  From the time 
newcomers made their way to the lands of other societies, in South Africa as elsewhere 
across the globe, sovereignty rather began as a series of contests between groups of 
colonisers and groups of indigenous peoples. This was a tussle often between multiple 
communities, over whose claims to authority – in particular, authority over land – were 
strongest and supported by might, and importantly, recognised by all kinds of outsiders.6 
There was no clear public/private divide in colonial sovereignty’s nascence. 
As some scholars helpfully propose, sovereignty in these contested colonial  contexts 
may be conceptualised as forming a number of layers, each representing a competing 
5 Weaver, Great Land Rush, p. 140.
6 See especially Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World:  
The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006).
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form  of  authority  over  people  and  places.7 The  political  geography  of  the  greater 
Philippolis region, from the start of the nineteenth century up to the end of it, I think 
presents a fine example of layered sovereignty – with San, Griqua, BaTswana, BaSotho, 
Boers and hybrids, each in their own communities vying for positions of power, all the 
while peered over by the administration in Cape Town connected by umbilical cord to 
England. Ultimately, in the Transorangia, it would be a settler polity formed out of Boers 
and Britons that would rise to a position of dominance after 1850, after which point 
these different layers began to disappear.
This  was  quite  similar  to  that  which  happened over  the  same conjuncture  in  North 
America and Australasia, as Weaver and several other scholars describe. Settlers could 
use the law – at  its  backbone,  the concept  of property – solely to  their favour, and 
disavow indigenous rights in the process. Thus ‘perfect settler sovereignty’ emerged: a 
brick fortress inside which colonised peoples would be stuck forever after.8 This is a 
situation tying into a modern, global context of today, featuring a world not layered but 
7 See, for instance,  Lauren Benton,  A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in  
European Empires, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press,  2010), 
esp. pp. 30–32. 
8 See  also Lisa  Ford,  Settler  Sovereignty:  Jurisdiction  and  Indigenous  People  in 
America and Australia, 1788–1836 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
Miranda Lawson, in her review of Ford’s majestic work, disputes the validity of her use 
of the term ‘indigenous rights’; she and others are likely sceptical that such ‘rights’ were 
things transcending various historical contexts, and considerable as a whole. But since 
rights talk was so prominent across many frontiers – often if not always coming from the 
lips  of  indigenous  peoples  facing  colonization  –  we  should  probably  see  this  as  a 
challenge  worth  overcoming,  and  reconsider  the  genealogy  of  indigenous  rights 
discourse.  For  this,  see  Miranda  Johnson,  ‘Review:  Lisa  Ford,  Settler  Sovereignty’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 53, 1 (2011), pp. 219-20.
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cluttered with nation-states and nation-states-to-be; a context in which the four-standard 
definition of sovereignty provided by Janice E. Thomson – as something constituted by 
cognisability,  stateliness,  authority  and  coercive  capacity  –  is  particularly  apt  and 
continues to be.9 So how did this context arrive in South Africa?
Right across the country, after settlers had done their best to monopolise sovereignty for 
themselves,  there  remained  the  tattered  threads  of  those  former  layers  during  the 
twentieth century, always at  the ready to contradict  and create problems. Nominally, 
state  sovereignty belonged to  the Union of  South Africa (1910-1961),  and later,  the 
Republic of South Africa (1961-), but the situation was always complicated. There were 
two main kinds of white settlers, divided by language and tradition, but together in their 
position at  the  top of  the social  pecking  order;  content  about  it  or  not,  they shared 
supremacy in the region. There were many kinds of Natives, and all sorts of Others; a 
community with a hierarchy of indigeneity that was erased by codified racial categories, 
resulting in a new pecking order more suitable for an industrialising national economy. 
Notwithstanding the unease with which the Union interacted with settler governments in 
Transvaal, the Orange Free State, Natal, and the Cape Province – federalism was never 
so conveniently installed into the country as it was elsewhere – the whole country was 
politically confused for Black peoples more so than it was for anyone else. Standing 
9 Janice E. Thomson, ‘State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap 
between Theory and Empirical Research’, International Studies Quarterly 39, 2 (1995), 
pp. 213-33. See also her laudable attempt to put sovereignty into historical perspective in 
Janice  E.  Thomson,  Mercenaries,  Pirates,  and  Sovereigns:  State-Building  and 
Extraterritorial  Violence  in  Early  Modern  Europe (Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press, 1994).
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aloof from the state were a few colonial Protectorates; within the state there were a few 
large  reservations  and,  after  the  1960s,  several  manufactured  polities  known  as 
Bantustans.  Each  of  these  was  an  artificial  geopolitical  entity  housing  a  variety  of 
ethnic/national  groupings,  and  most  came  with  their  own  kinds  of  customary 
jurisdictions.10 
When the ‘winds of change’ swept across Africa to mark the end of empire, they came in 
strange and unpredictable  swells  south  of  the  Zambezi.  Only  Britain’s  Protectorates 
transformed into large, independent nations at  first; and strange though these nations 
appeared (particularly Lesotho, like a large independent island in the country), this was a 
fate of ‘independence’ unrealistically hoped for the more fragmentary Bantustans too. 
One struggles to imagine how the Bantustan nation concept would have worked, with 
the Bantustans so erratically patchy and spread out right across the country; one need not 
waste one’s time however, as the plan fell  apart  when the  apartheid state’s coercive 
capacity and cognisability as ultimate sovereign were increasingly called into dispute by 
the international community from the late 1980s onwards. 
The era of full democracy beckoned in 1994. South Africa, the same sovereign entity as 
the  earlier  Republic,  received  a  makeover.  The  state’s  bureaucracy  reformed,  and 
constitution rewritten from scratch, the government was reborn by the African National 
10 Two recent attempts to problematise the singularity of sovereignty by analysing the 
politics of custom include Clifton Crais,  ‘Custom and the Politics of Sovereignty in 
South  Africa’,  Journal  of  Social  History  39,  3  (2006),  pp.  721-40;  Sean  Redding, 
Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880-1963 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006).
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Congress (ANC): a party that has enjoyed comfortable majority support at the national 
level and has possessed significant influence in the public service from 1994 to this very 
day. But  the ruling ANC merely took the reins off  the National  Party, inheriting its 
former legal  tradition and ideas about property, along with several other gifts,  many 
unwanted. 
Orania, a government-built labour camp constructed in the 1960s before its purchase by 
Afrikaner separatists in 1990, was witness to these huge transformations. It was, and still 
is no sovereign entity, for the contested days of layered sovereignty, when small polities 
like the Griqua could boast a sovereignty of their own, were well and truly over. Instead, 
as I argue in later chapters, the Afrikaans-only Orania movement would use the rules and 
regulations of the sovereign Republic (in both its pre- and post-1994 manifestations) to 
its own advantage. The new community at Orania would do so in order to preserve the 
unique land regime and exclusionary culture developed for itself, however contrary to 
the liberal-left, post-racialist consensus of the ‘new’ South Africa, and to the chagrin of 
ANC personalities.
This is a study about land rights, and the different regimes that create and erase them, 
that acknowledge and ignore them. By evoking the term ‘land rights’, I am referring to 
something more complex than that which its meaning in popular discourse sometimes 
conveys. I think it is important to return the notion of property to this concept, providing 
we can do so without  relying too heavily on the European canon of ‘property law’, 
bourgeois  notions  of  landedness,  or  any  settler-centric  understandings  of  exclusive 
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possession. We ought to see land rights as those rights of individuals or groups to enjoy 
some  kind  of  relationship  to  land,  whether  access,  use,  exploitation,  ownership  or 
something else springing from their own imagined land regime. With this in mind, my 
thesis sets out to provide a descriptive analysis of how a variety of land rights have 
intertwined through time within a particular space, with respect  to the legal-political 
contexts that thread into each and the greater sovereign order in which they participate. 
This is a historical study, but within it exist a number of commentaries about the present. 
I  come to  the  land  question  mindful  of  the  specificities  of  South  Africa’s  past  and 
present, but committed to presenting an appraisal free of exceptionalism, in the hope that 
it may provide some points of comparison to other settler locales where the restoration 
of past (and often, by consequence, ‘indigenous’) land rights in present political contexts 
is also a modern, definitive feature.
It is important to note that the meaning of indigenous is not so straightforward or clear in 
South Africa as it is elsewhere, and the appropriation of the term in this study is made 
further problematic by the very different historical contexts with which I am concerned. 
Before the coming of Europeans and the commencement of settler colonialism, South 
Africa was home to a complex population: some had been there far longer than others 
who had been there longer than others still.  The boundaries between these different 
communities  were  often  slightly  blurry,  becoming  more  so  after  a  Dutch  trading 
company established the foundations of settler society at the Cape and imported a large 
number of slaves from Africa and Asia from the mid-seventeenth century onward. By 
the nineteenth century, for all the social and ethnic distinctions definitive of the non-
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settler population, all became a kind of common colonial fodder as the settlers rose to 
their position of dominance and spread out across the land.
If we are to understand properly South African settler colonialism, it will be insufficient 
to regard the nineteenth century as a period in which indigenous people simply figure as 
polar opposites to the colonising population. I want to propose that we see indigeneity as 
a relative condition instead. Typically, the most indigenous people across South Africa 
were  the  hunter-gatherer  San.  After  the  San  came a  succession  of  other  indigenous 
groups,  many  of  whom  experienced  ethnogenesis  separately,  or  otherwise  migrated 
southwards into the region, at a later date. For my first case study in the middle Orange 
River, then, the San are considered more indigenous than the Griqua, and the Griqua 
(along  with  neighbouring  Khoekhoe,  BaSotho  and  BaTswana  populations)  more 
indigenous to that land than the least-indigenous  trekkers. Although this succession of 
human occupation will seem straight-forward to some (and perhaps annoying to others), 
unless it is properly acknowledged this historical study of land regimes and property 
rights will be misleadingly incomplete.
With regards to the twentieth century however, indigeneity becomes a far more complex 
matter for historians to explain. Racial categories, codified from above, pervaded into all 
forms  of  settler  discourse  in  this  period  –  homogenising  a  diverse,  multicultural 
population into universally coerced and conquered subjects of the settler state. Words 
like  ‘Coloured’,  ‘Indian’,  ‘Native’/‘Bantu’  et  al.,  fundamental  to  the  everyday 
functioning of  apartheid, were applied to peoples with specific meanings in mind that 
17
barely  corresponded  with  the  different  experiences  of  South  Africa’s  colonised 
population. And this population, as we have seen,  was diverse. Comprising the non-
settlers were descendants of those communities listed above, along with many of mixed 
descent;  on top of this,  there were a number of new groups,  among them labouring 
migrants from across Southern Africa who relocated to Johannesburg and Kimberley to 
work for the mines, and ‘coolies’ from South Asia who were used in plantation settings 
mostly in Natal. What was indigenous and what was not lost much of its relevance in 
such a context. 
By the end of the twentieth century, during the last decades of apartheid segregationism, 
the  principles  underlying  South  Africa’s  racially  stratified  society  were  slowly 
abandoned in both official and public discourses. And yet, during this transformation – 
from a strictly ordered society sequestered by racial categories, to an all-inclusive, race-
blind and democratic polity – the opportunity to redefine ‘indigenous’ in a fashion both 
historically  accurate  and  presently  meaningful  was  not  taken  by  those  steering  this 
transition. As it stands even today, indigeneity in South Africa is quarrelled over and 
contested by many, whilst wholly ignored by many others still. 
In such a context, therefore, it may be somewhat moot whether or not we regard the 
community of mostly Coloured individuals living in Orania in the 1970s and 1980s as 
traditionally  ‘indigenous’  –  particularly  when  it  appears  none  of  them  identified 
explicitly  as  such  during  the  removals  of  1989-91.  Yet,  when  we  consider  their 
occupation of the region relative to those who would come after them – in the same way 
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indigeneity is understood relatively in the first study of the San, Griqua and trekkers of 
Philippolis – we attain a valuable perspective on the land question in Orania and the 
wider region it resides in, and I think we are provided with a number of clues as to how 
land restitution and indigenous rights are understood in post-1994 South Africa.
While  paying  homage  to  a  broader  field  of  settler  colonial  studies,  this  thesis  is 
nonetheless an intimate study of  the local:  Orania and Philippolis are situated within 
100km of each other on the same stretch of river, and I chose them, from the outset, 
mainly for that reason. 
Figure 1. A stretch of the middle Orange River.
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During the course of this research, however, the most common criticism I encountered 
was that spatial vicinity is never in and of itself a valid justification for comparing two 
case studies; that their distance in time and context (and colour, by implication) will 
restrict me from reaching any neat conclusions. The point is a good one, but one with 
respect I am unpersuaded by, for I think there are many similarities between the two 
locales, as I hope to prove throughout the course of this thesis. Both settlements were 
formerly home to prior inhabitants, and these inhabitants had to be transferred away. 
Both communities emerged out of contested and dynamic political contexts – situations 
that  would  determine  how  they  saw  themselves  and  others.  Land  regulations  were 
devised within these respective contexts, in direct response to specific external pressures 
and the demands of the market. Internally, they were both tightly governed. Externally, 
to various institutions and individuals, they argued for their ‘rights’ – mainly rights to 
land and to special treatment – all the time. Indeed, in a way, this study is an historical 
exploration of the effective deployment of ‘rights talk’, and to that end, my argument 
carries across two centuries right up to the present day using Orania and Philippolis to 
do this.
Though I do not directly argue as much in this thesis, I want to make the suggestion that 
many land regimes, and not just a few, may be excavated from this particular space – 
and indeed several other confined spaces of South Africa – within this window of history 
(not to mention countless others if we are to look further back into the San past). The 
South  African  landscape  is  marked  by  a  number  of  levels  of  occupation  and 
dispossession.  Although  in  this  thesis  I  am  interested  in  identifying  the  historical 
20
complexities pertaining to just two case studies, I do so in the hope that I might connect 
with other histories of contest and exclusion that currently preoccupy the attention not 
only of Southern Africanists but also of scholars of settler colonialism. 
Perhaps here is a good place to provide a brief discussion on what is meant by settler  
colonialism. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism, insofar as 
the colonising community remains behind to capitalise on an unequal social relationship 
with  the  colonised  population,  governing  itself  and  Others  independently  from  the 
metropole.  Typically,  unlike  other  colonies  which  have  transformed  into  self-
determining nations with the era of decolonisation (with strikingly universal teleological 
predisposition, so it would seem from the literature11), settler colonies perform no such 
transformation and sovereignty remains held by a settler state which creates the political 
configuration  for  indigenous  individuals  to  weave through in  pursuit  of  redress  and 
restitution. South Africa appears to muddy the distinction between settler colonialism 
and colonialism, because the two forms have ‘interpenetrated and overlapped’ in the area 
for  some  time,  and  the  democratic  elections  of  1994  seem  to  mark  the  end  of 
11
1
 That most recent ‘age of Empire’ – the one which spread out across most of the globe, 
hauling select portions of it into ‘modernity’ as it went – ends, according to the textbook 
reading,  with  the  coming of  ‘decolonisation’ after  World  War II.  In  this  version  of 
history, colonies,  of  all  shapes  and sizes,  seem almost  predestined to  transform into 
nations  (each  of  them  commencing  their  own  journey  along  the  pathway  of 
development, ever choosing between communism and capitalism along the way). See, 
for  an  introduction,  R.  F.  Holland,  European  Decolonization,  1918–1981 (London: 
Macmillan,  1985); James D. Le Sueur (ed.),  The Decolonization Reader (New York: 
Routledge,  2003);  Raymond F. Betts,  Decolonization (New York:  Routledge,  2004); 
Dietmar  Rothermund,  The  Routledge  Companion  to  Decolonization (London: 
Routledge, 2006).
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something.12 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to regard the South African state as a place 
with a settler colonial past and a settler colonial present, firstly because it allows us to 
connect with a transnational framework of enquiry, and secondly because I think that 
South African history, for all of the upheavals and struggles that define it, holds within it 
more continuities than changes. 
‘The colonizers come to stay – invasion is a structure not an event’, writes Patrick Wolfe 
of settler colonialism, among the first to get the ball rolling in this body of transnational 
appraisal still quite new.13 As he would later clarify, settler colonialism has two definitive 
characteristics: ‘Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it 
erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base’.14 When stressing this point, 
Wolfe often pairs  it  with a  metaphor delivered off-the-cuff by Theodor Herzl in the 
12
1
 As  Lorenzo  Veracini  and  myself  have  noted  elsewhere,  ‘Settler  colonialism is  a 
global and transnational phenomenon, and as much a thing of the past as a thing of the 
present.  There is  no such thing as  neo-settler  colonialism or  post-settler  colonialism 
because  settler  colonialism is  a resilient  formation  that  rarely  ends.  […] Sometimes 
settler  colonial  forms  operate  within  colonial  ones,  sometimes  they  subvert  them, 
sometimes  they  replace  them.  But  even  if  colonialism  and  settler  colonialism 
interpenetrate and overlap, they remain separate as they co-define each other’. For this 
definition,  see  the  manifesto  at  <http://www.settlercolonialstudies.org/>,  accessed  20 
November 2011.
13 Patrick Wolfe,  Settler  Colonialism and the  Transformation of  Anthropology:  The  
Poetics and Politics of  an Ethnographic Event (London:  Cassell,  1999),  p.  2.  For a 
historiographical explanation of the emergence of settler colonial studies, see Edward 
Cavanagh, ‘Making Amends for Settler Colonialism: History, Time and the Indigenist 
Critique’, Arena Journal (forthcoming special issue on settler colonialism, March 2012).
14 Patrick Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’,  Journal of  
Genocide Research 8, 4 (2006), p. 388.
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introduction to his vintage piece of propaganda for Zionism, The Jewish State (1896): ‘If 
I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct’.
The inclusion of Israel/Palestine into a generalised line of theoretical reasoning about 
settlers and natives is not universally accepted among scholars, a dispute that will not be 
on my agenda to engage with here.15 But following Wolfe, it is worth pausing on the 
dialectical relationship that emerges from Herzl’s metaphor. It vividly symbolises the 
settler  colonial  contest;  it  ties  in again to another of Wolfe’s succinct  axioms – that 
‘settler  colonialism  destroys  to  replace’.16 Resistance  must  be  cleared  away  before 
settlers  can  move  in  and  occupy  the  land  exclusively.  This  is  classical  settler 
colonialism.
It is perhaps quite strange – and probably indicative both of the adolescence of settler 
colonial  studies  and  of  the  historiographical  barriers  that  continue  to  impede 
comparative  analysis  –  that  Wolfe  refuses  to  incorporate  South  Africa  into  his 
framework.  Seeing  settler  colonialism  as  a  contest  primarily  over  land rather  than 
labour –  a  social  formation  embodying ‘a  logic  of  elimination’ at  its  core  –  Wolfe 
identifies in South Africa more of a classically exploitative colonial formation. Its rancid 
15
1
 For an introduction to this debate, see  Lorenzo Veracini,  Israel and Settler Society 
(London: Ann Arbor, 2006); Gabriel Piterberg, The Returns of Zionism: Myths, Politics  
and Scholarship in Israel (London: Verso, 2008); Zeev Sternhell, ‘In Defence of Liberal 
Zionism’, and Gabriel Piterberg, ‘Settler and their States: A Reply to Zeev Sternhell’, in 
New Left Review 62, March-April (2010). See also settler colonial studies 1, 2 (2012), 
special issue on Palestine.
16 Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, p. 388.
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elements of slavery merely superseded by the mass-proletarianisation of the colonised 
population after  industrialisation,  in South Africa the colonisers asked very different 
things of the colonised; they were always a minority dependent on ‘native labour’. The 
‘natives’, for their part, were ultimately contained by segregation rather than destroyed, 
and  today  they  have  reached  a  kind  of  political  independence  that  settler-colonised 
peoples  elsewhere  will  unlikely  attain.17 With  colonialism,  unlike  with  settler 
colonialism,  ‘at  least  the  legislators  generally  change  colour’,  writes  Wolfe.18 Thus, 
despite the many different social groups in South Africa that fall under the umbrellas of 
Coloured, White, Asian (and others), that the ANC is predominately Black renders a 
post-1994 South  Africa  the  same as  a  post-colonial South  Africa,  according  to  this 
simple litmus test: ergo, South Africa seems colonial and not settler colonial.
Rather  than  directly  take  issue  with  Wolfe’s  argument  here  –  it  is  hoped  that  the 
empirical research presented in the following chapters does this instead – it is worth 
identifying  another  scholar  who  has  thoughtfully  considered  South  Africa  within  a 
framework  of  settler  colonial  studies.  Lorenzo  Veracini,  in  Settler  Colonialism:  A 
Theoretical  Overview (2010),  provides  a  description of  the ‘population economy’ of 
17
1
 Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, pp 403-4. As he put it 
in an interview with indigenous Hawaiian scholar J. Kehaulani Kauanui, South Africa is 
‘just a colony that happens to have settlers in it; it is not a settler colony in my sense [of 
defining settler colonialism by its logic of native elimination]’.  Patrick Wolfe, Interview 
with  J.  Kehaulani  Kauanui  (Indigenous  Politics:  From  Native  New  England  and 
Beyond),  esp.  31:00-33:00.  Available  online  at:  < 
http://indigenouspolitics.mypodcast.com/2010/07/Patrick_Wolfe_on_the_Logic_of_Settl
er_Colonialism-319321.html >, accessed 8 August 2011.
18 Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, p. 2.
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settler  colonialism,  listing  a  number  of  ‘transfer’  strategies  deployed  by  settlers  to 
remain at the top of the social order of things.19 There are many discursive strategies of 
transfer, as he makes clear in his extensive typology; but probably the most decisive of 
these techniques are the physical ones – grizzly strategies such as forcible deportation 
and removal, mass genocide, and the like.20 Paraphrasing Veracini with respect – his 
transnational argument is elegant but complex – indigenous peoples (and various Others) 
have to be transferred away before settlers can be transferred onto the land.21
Transfer  is  identified in  both  of  my case  studies.  In  fact,  in  my analysis  of  Griqua 
Philippolis, it appears twice: the Griqua transferred the San people away from the region 
in order to create their own polity, and forty years later the Boers did virtually the same 
to them. The latter removal is standard settler colonialism, and yet so may the former be 
if  we  can  disengage  with  the  colour-coded  binaries  that  seem  mandatory  in  our 
appraisals of colonial and settler colonial encounters. With regards to Afrikaner Orania, I 
19
1
 The term also has its origins in Zionist discourse. For this, see Israel Shahak, ‘A 
History of the Concept of “Transfer” in Zionism’,  Journal of Palestine Studies 18, 3 
(1989),  pp.  22-37;  Nur  Masalha,  Expulsion  of  the  Palestinians:  The  Concept  of  
“Transfer”  in  Zionist  Political  Thought,  1882-1948 (Washington,  D.C:  Institute  for 
Palestine Studies, 1992). Even Herzl, elsewhere in his Returns discussing the strategies 
required by settlers when competing with others for land, writes: ‘In the distribution of 
land every precaution will be taken to effect a careful transfer with due consideration for 
acquired  rights’.  Theodor  Herzl,  The  Jewish  State (New  York:  Dover  Publications, 
1988), p. 127. 
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 Lorenzo  Veracini,  Settler  Colonialism:  A  Theoretical  Overview  (Houndmills: 
Palgrave, 2011), pp. 33-52.
21 Of course, this did not always occur in any orderly procession. As in the case of the 
early Republic of Transvaal (and indeed much like the entirety of Australia), settler title 
to land was issued before transfer of population, which came afterwards.
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identify only one transfer: it took place when the town’s new settlers realised there were 
residents  living  in  their  volkstaat who,  due  not  to  linguistic  but  rather  to  genetic 
endowment, were ineligible to pass as white Afrikaners and continue living in the town.
*     *     *
I am not the first to write of the nineteenth-century Griqua with the land question in 
mind; nor am I the first to bound out across the ever-shifting frontier of South Africa 
with the suggestion that we clear our minds of preconceived notions regarding property. 
Indeed, it was a classic observation made by many of the early liberal historians that 
certain legal ideas pertaining to land use and ownership brought by settlers conflicted 
with indigenous ideas, to the terrible disadvantage of those who were there in the first 
place. It was W. M. Macmillan in The Cape Colour Question in 1927 who first wrote, 
with respect to South Africa, how ‘the details of our [i.e. settler] law of property are 
highly conventional, and very largely depend on the accidents of history and individual 
point of view’. The ‘most fruitful matter of friction with the African natives’ was, as he 
put it, a strangely ‘sacred’ idea of ‘individual ownership of land’ that was favoured by 
Europeans  on  colonial  frontiers.22 A  claim  like  this  relies,  necessarily,  upon  a 
homogenous  image  of  ‘Europe’ here  with  which  I  have  only  a  few  qualms  given 
Macmillan’s context, but perhaps more dangerous is the attempt to see property from the 
eyes of ‘the native’ – something that led him to make into simplistic generalisations. 
22
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 W. M. Macmillan,  The Cape Colour Question: A Historical Survey (London: Faber 
and Gwyer, 1927), pp. 29-30.
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‘The so-called savage, like the poorest of our own poor, readily shares his last bite with 
his fellows’, Macmillan goes on, romantically:
But at the same time, if he ‘owns’ not so much as one sheep, he regards the 
nearest ‘fountain’, and the beasts that share it with him, as in some indefinable 
way ‘his’. If the trekking Boer, with his developed sense of individual property, 
chooses,  as  he  must,  to  water  his  cattle  at  the  Bushman’s fountain,  then  the 
Bushmen who lives by his skill in the chase, and to whom beef is more palatable 
than mutton, justifies his action of ‘theft’ by immemorial custom, which gave 
him a ‘right’ to animals using his water-hole.23
Similar  sentiment  shows  up  in  the  work  of  Macmillan’s  contemporary,  J.  A.  Agar-
Hamilton, who in his book,  Road to the North (1937), expressed dismay at imported 
discourses of territoriality and sovereignty – lamenting how ‘the whites approached their 
relations  with  the  natives  with  minds  prepossessed  by  European  notions  of  landed 
property’, with the reality for indigenous groups, as he saw it, being quite different.24 
‘The tribes themselves overlapped’: 
Cattle  stations  belonging  to  the  BaThlaping  penetrated  the  fringe  of  those 
attached to the BaRolong, while Thlaping clans were scattered through territory 
23
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 Macmillan, The Cape Colour Question, p. 31.
24 J. A. I. Agar-Hamilton, The Road to the North: South Africa, 1852-1886 (London and 
New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937), p. 86
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claimed by the Griquas. Yet to the natives the problem seemed simple enough. 
Jurisdiction was personal, not territorial: each clan rendered allegiance to its own 
chief and there was little difficulty until the white man introduced his theories of 
territorial  domination.  The  same  fountain  might  even  be  shared  by  different 
communities, and their placid common sense solved problems that would tease 
the juridical ability of the League of Nations.25
Macmillan and Agar-Hamilton, and probably others like them, expressed great regret 
about the phenomenon they described. It is quite true to say, however, that Macmillan’s 
‘Bushman’ and Agar-Hamilton’s SeTswana tribes are identified more for their rhetorical 
value  than  any other  reason –  a  nominal  hat-tip  supposedly lending weight  to  their 
sympathetic generalisations. 
It  would  not  be  until  1961  that  serious  issue  would  be  taken  with  these  kinds  of 
summations. The historian Martin Legassick, who in his mammoth PHD dissertation 
focused on the politics of missionary activity and the formidable, state-like polities of 
BaSotho, BaTswana and Griqua communities in the Transorangia, argued that
areas of jurisdiction overlapped and intermingled. It has been argued by many 
that this overlapping was a consequence of the ‘personal jurisdiction’ in non-
white  political  communities:  that  chiefs  had  authority  over  subjects  and  not 
territory. This argument is untenable; […] traditional Sotho-Tswana communities 
25
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 Agar-Hamilton, The Road to the North, p. 6.
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(and Khoi and San communities as well) all recognised some form of territorial 
dominion. Those settled within that territory owed obligations to its ruler.26
For Legassick, these kinds of land arrangements discontinued by the 1870s, supposedly 
after  which point  property relations changed:  the  system of  outright  land ownership 
became  increasingly  rigidified.  Legassick’s  work  is  very  important,  and  remains  so 
today;  particularly respecting the missionary enterprise in the region,  it  has come in 
handy on many occasions during the preparation of this study. Yet he closes his analysis 
not in the 1870s but at the year 1840, and the Philippolis Griqua receive scant attention 
in his otherwise monumental work. For them, we have to turn to the work of others, and 
thankfully  we are blessed with three strata  of solid historiographical  foundation:  the 
breakthrough provided by J. S. Marais in 1939; more solid and in-depth research from 
Robert Ross in the 1970s; and a clear, complete and complementary re-reading of both 
in the writings of Karel Schoeman in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Marais – if, however, we may consider it unfortunate today that he piled the Griqua and 
others like them into a great mass he saw as The Cape Coloured People – was the first to 
provide a close reading of key documents relevant to Griqua Philippolis and identify the 
intricacies  of  the  Griqua  state.27 He  considered  land  and  jurisdiction  matters  of 
26
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 Martin Legassick, The Politics of a South African Frontier: The Griqua, the Sotho-
Tswana and the Missionaries,  1780-1840 (Basel:  Basler Afrika Bibliographien,  2010 
[1969]), pp. 328-9.
27 J. S. Marais, The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937 (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1939).
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considerable import, and provided a narrative in which the Griqua Captains gradually 
lost their ability to supervise not only the growing number of land-hungry trekboere, but 
also their own subjects. His reading of history is insightful, though a little outdated now; 
the work of Ross and Schoeman took these ideas to a whole new level of clarity and 
insight, and it is from their work that mine takes its inspiration more so than it does from 
Marais’s.  Ross  gave  us  an  incredibly  vivid  picture  showing  how  the  Griqua  state 
worked; pairing this with a sound economic understanding of South African history, he 
delivered a concise adjudication on the rise and fall of Philippolis and, likewise, the rise 
and  fall  of  Kokstad  in  his  book,  Adam  Kok’s  Griquas  (1976).28 Schoeman’s  work 
complements Ross’s well, as it is slightly more sensitive to the social dynamics of the 
Griqua community at Philippolis, and more detailed (he often allows his quoted sources 
to run and run over several pages).29
Since I am calling upon the same, very limited source base that both of these historians 
have done – and here I should warrant my indebtedness particularly to Schoeman for his 
reproduction and translation of many in his two collections, Griqua Records (1996) and 
The Griqua Mission (2005)30 – I do not in this study dispute any arguments made by 
them. Both, after all, are sensitive to the question of land, central as it is the history of 
28
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 Robert  Ross,  ‘Griqua  Power  and Wealth:  An Analysis  of  the  Paradoxes  of  their 
Interrelationship’.  Seminar  Paper,  Societies  of  Southern  Africa  in  the  19th  and  20th 
Centuries (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1972); Robert Ross,  ‘Griqua 
Government’,  African  Studies  33/4  (1974),  pp.  25-42;  Robert  Ross,  Adam  Kok’s 
Griquas:  A Study in  the Development  of  Stratification in South Africa   (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976).
29 Karel Schoeman, The Griqua Captaincy of Philippolis, 1826-1861 (Pretoria: Protea 
Book House, 2002).
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the Griqua; and both understand well the place allotted to the Griqua in the agendas of 
the Cape administration and the Orange Free State. 
The main original contribution I offer in my findings relates to the place of the San in 
the Griqua narrative. By exploring how the Griqua, and later the Boers, conceived of 
themselves on ‘Bushmanland’, and how, after the San were obliterated, both Griqua and 
Boers considered their possession of this country as natural,  I hope to present a new 
perspective to the land question, problematising any clear settler/native binary along the 
way. Peering into settler discourse,  I consider the most important person neither Jan 
Mocke the  famous republican  nor  M. A.  Oberholster  the  loyalist  diplomat,  as  other 
historians  have  inferred,  but  the  humble  pastoralist  Johannes  Coetze,  whose  vocal 
complaints about San genocide and land treaties had perhaps just as much influence on 
British policy as anyone else’s did. 
When it comes to the existing literature on Orania, however, the historian is far less 
blessed, and it is in the chapters I devote to it that I present my most original research. 
There have been a few theses and articles that have surfaced in the last decade which are 
eye-opening and valuable, but none in which the land question is approached directly.31 
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 Karel Schoeman (ed.), Griqua Records: The Philippolis Captaincy, 1825-1861 (Cape 
Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1996);  Karel  Schoeman (ed.),  The Griqua Mission  at  
Philippolis, 1822-1837 (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2005).
31 Lindi Renier Todd, ‘What’s in a Name? The Politics of the Past within Afrikaner 
Identifications  in  Post-Apartheid  South  Africa’.  D.  Phil  Dissertation  (University  of 
London, 2007); Terisa Pienaar, ‘Die Aanloop tot en stigting van Orania as groeipunt vir 
’n Afrikaner-volkstaat’.  M. A. Dissertation. (Stellenbosch University, 2007);  F. C. de 
Beer, ‘Exercise in Futility or Dawn of Afrikaner Self-Determination: An Exploratory 
Ethno-Historical investigation of Orania’, Anthropology Southern Africa 29, 3-4 (2006), 
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Neither has the removal of former residents been described by anyone yet (though it has 
been  called  a  ‘transfer’  by  Veracini  in  a  recent  opinion  piece  for  settler  colonial  
studies).32 
To understand properly the Oranian land regime, I had to make several excursions to the 
volkstaat,  where I  interviewed residents and pleaded for paperwork,  later  translating 
them from Afrikaans; in the process, I had to seek literature and opinion on the strangely 
South  African  tenure  convention  known  as  the  ‘share  block’.  To  work  out  what 
happened when former residents were transferred away and the new settlers came in, I 
battled to persuade various departments of the Commission on the Restitution of Land 
Rights to provide me with a copy of their investigation. Newspaper articles and opinion 
pieces on Orania exist in abundance, which are helpful but need to be read with great 
caution, coming as they often do with biases and inaccurate details.33
pp. 105-14.
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 Lorenzo  Veracini,  ‘Afterword:  Orania  as  Settler  Self-Transfer’,  settler  colonial 
studies 2, 1 (2011), pp. 190-6.
33 See,  for  example,  Chris  McGreal,  ‘A people clutching at  straws’,  The Guardian, 
29/1/2000.  Available  online  at: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2000/jan/29/books.guardianreview3>,  viewed 
10/1/2011;
Paul McNally, ‘Come Gawk at the Racists’, Thought Leader, 1/2/2010. Available online 
at:  <http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/paulmcnally/2010/02/01/orania-tourism-come-
gawk-
at-the-racists/>, viewed 10/1/2011. This kind of journalism, for all its purchase among 
the self-righteous, offers little insight into the land and life of Orania. 
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*     *     *
Following  this  introduction,  the  next  two  chapters  will  deal  with  the  Griqua  of 
Philippolis. In the first, I discuss the erasure of past interests in land and the creation of 
the Griqua state. A contest takes place on this land, part of a large area that was once 
known as the ‘Bushman Country’. Indeed, Philippolis itself only got its name in 1822, 
and the ‘station’ founded on this land was to exist predominantly for San converts. And 
so it did, until the end of 1825, when a change in London Missionary Society policy 
paved the way for Adam Kok II and his Griqua to assume the land for his own subjects. 
Within a few years, the San of this little station, and likewise the independent San bands 
of the surrounding region, became the targets of the Griqua. They had to be removed 
from the country in order for a new, pastoralism-based economy, supported by individual 
land tenure, to emerge in Philippolis.
In the following chapter, I illustrate how the Griqua land regime was put together, and 
how others recognised it. Perpetually imperilled by white settlers caught up in the great 
land rush, their land regime became wobbly. To describe this, mostly I show how Kok 
had his jurisdiction weakened and eventually taken away from him, as the currents of 
settler discourse gradually impeded into administrative decisions, leaving him powerless 
to administer his state. His land regime was destroyed, and he removed with his subjects 
to ‘Griqualand East’.
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The Afrikaners of Orania then receive two chapters, in which I pursue identical lines of 
enquiry.  First,  I  note  how  the  erasure  of  past  interests  in  land  was  a  fundamental 
requirement for the  volkstaat to emerge. The town was state property for slightly over 
two decades: it was used as a settlement for both professional and labouring employees 
of the Department of Water Affairs. For a number of reasons, however, by the 1980s, the 
Department decided to wind down their projects on the Orange River, and Orania was 
eventually placed on the open market in 1989. Shortly after Carel Boshoff III and the 
Orania  Bestuurdienste purchased  the  land (and improvements)  with  the  intention  of 
establishing a  volkstaat, however, it soon became evident that the land had residents. 
These people had to be removed for Orania to become the model Afrikaner town many 
hoped it would become.
In  the  second chapter  I  devote to  Orania,  I  describe  the  unique  system of  property 
relations  developed  there:  a  ‘share  block’ system.  Settlers  do  not  enjoy  freehold  or 
leasehold tenure, but instead have a share which bestows usufructuary rights upon them. 
In order to ensure that only candidates deemed appropriate by the overseeing company 
buy shares and live in the community, a strict screening process has been put into place. 
In the last decade, this system has faced several challenges. Private interests have sniffed 
around the volkstaat, looking for investment opportunities; provincial law has changed 
to put pressure upon the representative system developed by Orania; a land claim was 
lodged to the town by those former inhabitants who were removed in early 1991. Each 
of these affrays is covered in detail.
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What  follows  is  a  study  of  regimes  and  rights,  in  which  it  gradually  emerges  that 
sovereignty makes all the difference. These threads will be brought together and a set of 
comparative claims will be made in conclusion.
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2.
THE ERASURE OF PAST INTERESTS IN LAND AND THE CREATION 
OF GRIQUA PHILIPPOLIS.
INTRODUCTION:
In this chapter, I introduce the Griqua people of South Africa, and delve into the politics 
of their formation and expansion in the Transorangia region. Featuring in the following 
narrative  are  a  number  of  missionaries,  some important  representatives  of  the  Cape 
Colonial government, several annoyed white farmers, and members of the oldest cultural 
group in South Africa, the San people. It is a narrative about property – about the laws 
regulating land on a settler colonial frontier – and at the centre of it is a contest over 
rights: a contest marked by a series of violent dispossessions, in which the San lost out 
to another, more powerful group.
The land in and around Philippolis is the stage for this contest. As I show below, various 
communities have used this land and competed over it, until in 1826 it was alienated by 
a group of missionaries (who had negligible right to it in the first place) and given to the 
Griqua in full.  Following this,  I  show how the prior interests  of the region’s earlier 
inhabitants had to be annulled, in order for the Griqua to transform the region into an 
exclusively Griqua domain and expand its borders northwards across the pasturage of 
the Transorangia. 
As the  historian  Mohamed  Adhikari  has  recently  shown in  his  pioneering  study  of 
genocide during the conquest of South Africa, San society was annihilated by the end of 
the nineteenth century, and a classical settler society was erected over the top of it.34 In 
this chapter, I describe how this process occurred in greater Philippolis and advance his 
thesis  by  suggesting  that  the  extermination  of  the  San  accorded  not  only  with  the 
interests of the white Boer population, but other groups, like the Griqua, as well.
POLITICS:
The Griqua people had ancient links to Southern Africa, like many groups did; though 
they were relative newcomers to the lands north of the middle Orange. The adoption of 
the  name  ‘Griqua’ –  adapted  from the  Grigriqua (Khoekhoe)  of  the  Western  Cape 
coastal belt – was roughly coincident with their ethnogenesis as a group, in just the early 
nineteenth  century.  They were  formed out  of  a  collection  of  rather  diverse  peoples: 
initially among them were to be found a large proportion of Khoekhoe and Bastaards, 
along with the odd San and a few runaway slaves; but their communities soon came to 
incorporate large numbers of BaSotho and BaTswana.35 What separated the Griqua from 
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Secretary, 18 April 1845, reproduced in Karel Schoeman (ed.),  Griqua Records: The 
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Philippolis] live[s] immediately under my rule’. 
most  others  was  their  social  and  political  organisation.36 Manipulating  the  uncertain 
geopolitical conditions of the regions in which they settled, and eagerly making use of 
the enthusiastic missionaries deployed by the London Missionary Society (LMS), they 
established powerful polities in their own right. 
To the distress of the missionaries, the original Griqua state, Griquatown, had in the 
1820s become split into a number of factions. The controversial installation of a new 
leader, Andries Waterboer, inspired a contingent of rebels (known as the Bergenaars) to 
attempt an overthrow of the government in favour of one of the more traditional Griqua 
leaders,  such  as  Berend  Berends,  or  a  member  of  the  Kok  dynasty.37 A number  of 
meetings were held to no avail, before the Griqua eventually split into four groups that 
went  their  own ways. Many moved to the nearby Campbell  settlement, while others 
sought to establish a new Griqua polity.
In  1826,  with  the  permission  of  LMS  superintendant  Dr.  John  Philip,  some  of  the 
dissenting Griquas were allowed to move east  and settle at Philippolis, a missionary 
station 200km to the southeast of Griquatown, established in 1822 for the San.38 
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LAND:
The Philippolis region – the land of the middle Orange River – like much of Southern 
Africa,  was  originally  the  domain  of  a  hunter-gatherer  population  of  San  (or 
‘Bushmen’). Whether the San owned this land or simply occupied it is a moot point, as 
will be clear once a patchwork of human history in the region is unravelled.
Like other indigenous hunter-gatherer communities across the settler world today, the 
San are commonly esteemed in the popular imagination to have a ‘special’ or ‘mystical’ 
relationship to land, but seldom has this – or, historically, was this  – relationship been 
considered to be orderly, governed by norms and laws, or even cognisable to courts.39 
This estimation deserves our closest interrogation. The conventions that dictate, say, the 
value given to semi-permanent hunting camps, or when a community moves onto new 
land for foraging, or how one group shares the produce of a particular area with another 
migratory group – although never codified into the written form – are far more complex 
than  many  assume,  and  were  certainly  central  to  the  political  organisation  of  San 
communities of Bushmanland-proper for tens of thousands of years.40 Or so they were 
for  tens  of  thousands  of  years,  until  established  property  relations  were  further 
complicated by increasing interaction with relative communities, the herding Khoekhoe, 
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just in the last two thousand years.41 New kinds of ecological adaptation (considering the 
land for pastoral use, and not exclusively for foraging, for instance), the introduction of 
improvable chattel property in the form of domesticated animals, and the addition of 
semi-fixed dwellings, all combined to inform the types of land regimes developed by 
communities in this period.
These indigenous systems of property relations which evolved in South Africa, at the 
hands of hunters and herders, while never placid or static during this period of history, 
were heavily rattled by the southern migrations of agriculturalist Briqua – this was the 
Khoe  term  for  Bantu-speaking  Africans42 – and,  more  devastatingly,  by  the 
commencement  of  company  colonialism  in  1652.  As  colonisation  intensified  at  the 
41
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Cape, and settlers (and their slaves) came to stay, local communities of ‘Hottentots’ and 
‘Bosjemen’  were  split  apart;  indeed,  their  numbers  fell  away  just  as  gradually  as 
European and Briqua populations strengthened over the same period. The ‘Khoe-San’ – 
for their populations were never discrete, and the distinction always blurred, scholars 
argue43 – adapted to these changes. Out of fear from disease, servitude, and murder, most 
kept  their  distance  from  the  dense  coastal  settlements,  and  continued  life  as  they 
otherwise would – hunting, gathering and herding – sometimes cooperative with other 
groups, and sometimes antagonistic.
By the late eighteenth century, the middle Orange River region, beyond the frontier of 
settlement,  had  become  a  busy  meeting  place.  San,  who  foraged  ingeniously,  and 
Khoekhoe (mostly Korana groups), who established seasonal herding routes through the 
area, were no longer alone. One could also find the southwardly spreading populations 
of BaSotho and BaTswana (those Briqua so far away in the 1600s were now everyone’s 
neighbours). Entrepreneurial trekboere, in the first of many waves of white pastoralism, 
made their way there too. And there was also a growing number of outcasts who had fled 
an  expanding  Cape  Society,  among  them,  the  mixed-descent  (European-slave  and 
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European-Khoe-San individuals)  Bastaards.44 It was a meeting place that soon became 
incredibly volatile,  and sadly, it  would be the San,  particularly those who held most 
strongly onto their traditional hunter-gatherer ways, that were most victimised.45 Into this 
context stepped the missionaries.
The  London  Missionary  Society  –  before  their  cataclysmic  Christianising  campaign 
across Southern Africa from the mid-nineteenth century onwards – were only tentatively 
treading out into the South African interior in the first two decades of the century.46 After 
the rise  and fall  of  the  Sak River  mission (1800-1806),  and following a number of 
exploratory  expeditions  after  this,  it  became quickly  apparent  to  the  LMS just  how 
destitute the San people, on the fringes of Cape settler society, had become. Their plan to 
offset their complete annihilation was to create a number of stations for the San, between 
1814  and  the  mid-1820.47 Among  them  was  Philippolis,  just  north  of  what  would 
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become the Orange River border, established in early 1822; seemingly like the other 
LMS stations, Philippolis stood on land that was not formally ceded by prior inhabitants.
Within six months of establishment, according to an estimate, Philippolis had become a 
base for approximately eighty San, just twenty or so of which were actually living at the 
station. All were under the instruction of the ‘Native Teacher’, a  Bastaard called Jan 
Goeyman.48 Goeyman was eventually replaced – or rather, demoted and ignored – by 
James Clark of the LMS in 1825, by which time, several families of  Bastaards  and 
Khoekhoe,  many  from  nearby  Bethelsdorp,  had  also  congregated  in  Philippolis, 
apparently  living  in  amity  with  the  San there.49 On top  of  this,  a  number  of  white 
trekboere –  ignorant  of  the  LMS project  and  tenuously  loyal  to  the  Crown –  were 
making  their  way  through  the  region,  in  their  early  expeditions  across  the  colonial 
border in search for springs and pastures. 
It was around this time, in 1825, that Dr. John Philip of the LMS crossed the Orange on 
an important tour. He would soon head to England for an extended visit, and so desired 
to tie off some loose ends in the frontier before leaving for home. One of the main issues 
he wanted resolved was the political conflict that had recently broken out in Griquatown, 
between those loyal to Andries Waterboer and those opposing him. About this, he is said 
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to have given a number of instructions to his stationed missionaries: Waterboer, primed 
by the Griquatown missionary John Melvill, was to be supported as leader, and Adam 
Kok II’s followers and any other dissenters would have to comply with this mandate, or 
move out to settle elsewhere.
Another pressing issue for Philip was the state of the San mission stations, which in his 
eyes  were  failing miserably. Recalling his  1825 visit  to  Philippolis  in  1842 (though 
perhaps with the haze of time distorting the specifics), Philip described how he
found that the Boers who had been recently settled in the new District so lately 
added to the Colony, had found their way across the river, and were beginning to 
annoy those who had the conducting of the mission and to oppress the Bushmen, 
under  the  pretext  of  searching  for  stolen  Cattle,  and  runaway Bushmen,  and 
Children, who they alleged to have been contract to them, and promised them by 
their parents.
The  missionaries  were  set  at  defiance,  the  Statements  of  Bushmen  were 
disregarded by the Boers; their [sic] was no authority in the country to decide 
such questions, and the Bushmen were unable to protect themselves.
Proceeding Northward I came to the residence of Adam Kok, one of our Griqua 
Chiefs and the father of the present Chief of Philippolis, whose territory lay next 
to the lands of Philippolis and who proposed to protect the Bushmen against the 
aggressions of the Boers, provided I would permit him to reside at Philippolis. To 
this proposal I gave my consent on this condition, that he not to dispossess the 
Bushmen of such lands as they might require nor consider himself or his heirs as 
having any right to sell any part of the Country or to give a lease of any part of it, 
except to his own people, and that he and they were merely to have the use of the 
lands as belonging to a Missionary Institution.50
With the Philippolis San in such a miserable condition, and Kok II still loyal to the LMS 
and eager  to  relocate,  Philip  apparently  gave instructions  to  kill  two birds  with one 
stone, as the above passage makes clear. When, early in 1826, Peter Wright of the LMS 
arrived to relieve Melvill of the Griquatown posting, the plan was put into action, and a 
mariage  de  convenance was  hastily  arranged  for  Kok II  and  the  restless  Bergenaar 
faction, on the condition that the San receive protection. But just how this took place, 
and what happened afterwards, would become the source of a great feud between Clark 
and Wright – and a worry, of course, to Philip.
As Clark remembered the event, he was in Philippolis and caught off-guard when Wright 
arrived, ‘and informed me that […] Dr Philip had requested that […] he was at liberty to 
form  a  station  among  [the  Bergenaars]  where  he  choosed,  even  at  Philippolis’. 
Following this,  ‘Mr Wright  proceeded to  the Bergenaars  and gave  them Dr Philip’s 
authority  to  occupy Philippolis,  which they consented  to  do’.  Clark,  perhaps  a  little 
unsure of his role, gave Philippolis up in July of 1826. ‘[N]ot doubting Mr Wright’s 
50
5
 Council  for  World  Missions  Archive  (hereafter:  CWMA)  266,  (LMS  18/4/A), 
Appendix Two: ‘The Tenure by which the Griqua hold the Lands of Philippolis’ (1842). 
My thanks to Jared McDonald for sourcing me a copy of this document in its entirety, 
and also for his assistance with my other LMS queries. For similar sentiments, see also 
CWMA  Africa  Odds  623,  quoted  in  Karel  Schoeman,  The  Griqua  Captaincy  of  
Philippolis, 1826-1861 (Pretoria: Protea Book House, 2002), p. 43.
authority’, he recalled, ‘we called in the Bergenaars to Philippolis, and I even gave them 
the station over in Writting [sic], in order that they might be inclined to protect it’.51
That Philippolis had fallen out of the LMS’s hands and straight into those of Kok II 
quickly became a source of regret to both Clark and Wright. Wright, for his part, claimed 
that  it  was  not  his  idea  at  all,  but  Clark’s,  to  bring  the  Griqua  to  Philippolis  and 
‘remov[e] the Bushman Station’. What distressed Wright most of all were the terms of 
the agreement between Clark and Kok II. As he wrote angrily to Clark in May 1826:
From the document put into my hands which you have to A. Kok dated 22 July 
1826  [i.e. a receipt of the agreement between Clark and Kok II52], consisting of 
four separate strange articles, I find you have not only ceded the station to all 
intents and purposes to the Captain and his people, which is an act neither you 
nor the Missionary Society had power to do, but you ceded the missionary also, 
whoever he may be, for ever, so that by your paper he is become to all intents 
and purposes a subject of the Captain of Philippolis.53
That the land and the houses on them were ‘ceded’ to Kok II was a step too far, Wright 
claimed.  After  all,  in  Philip’s  appraisal  (or,  perhaps,  as  Philip  remembered this 
appraisal),  the Griqua  were  ‘merely to  have the use  of  the  lands  as  belonging  to  a 
51
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Missionary Institution’. Clark, in defence, claimed firstly, that Wright had misinterpreted 
Philip’s wishes for the prior inhabitants of Philippolis; and secondly, he argued that Kok 
II could not be considered the leader and landlord of Philippolis, because his Bergenaar 
subjects – seemingly displeased with the social experiment that the LMS had in mind for 
them – abandoned Philippolis and fled north, meaning that Kok II could not fulfil his 
own  obligations  in  the  contract.  As  Clark  (referring  to  himself  ‘Missionary  to  the 
Bushmen’)  put  it  to  Andries  Stockenström  at  Graaff  Reinet  in  September  1827, 
‘whatever power Dr Philip may have given Mr Wright in this case, yet for the honour of 
Dr Philip’,
he did not mean to deprive a poor people just emerging out of  Heathenism of 
their  houses which they were encouraged by their  Missionary to build in the 
prospect of enjoying them […] and I must further add in behalf of Dr Philip that 
his allowing the Bergenaars to occupy any part of the Bushmen Country was […] 
to lead these people off from their  Marauding practises,  and bring them to a 
Settled State of Life – Their leaving Philippolis, however, did not answer the end 
intended, and it surely cannot be argued that because their Kaptain Adam Kok 
and  a  few  of  his  relatives  remained,  that  he  can  still  claim  dominion  and 
possession of the Bushman Country, and fill it with Korannas, Caffres and other 
Griquas, to the prejudice of the poor Bushmen and of the original inhabitants of 
Philippolis, placing the former out of the protection of the Colony and depriving 
the latter of their property unless they became Griquas, which is neather their 
interest nor in their power to be […]54
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Importantly, Clark here admitted that Kok II, at one time, had ‘dominion and possession 
of the Bushman Country’ around Philippolis. Most probably, these were rights granted to 
him in the ‘four separate strange articles’ of the original treaty, and not given to him by 
Wright or Philip; but in the end, it did not matter whose responsibility it was. Philip was 
off the continent and could not intervene. Kok II, in the meantime, happily accepted 
dominium and would not relinquish it easily: within a few years, Philippolis became the 
base  for  over  a  hundred  Griqua  farmers.  They were  spread  out  to  the  north  across 
700,000ha or so of land, most of which land originally a kind of commons among its 
former users, and was presumably not part of the original transaction made between the 
LMS and the Griqua, but instead assumed outright by the expanding Griqua. ‘They had 
come to stay’,  according to one historian,  on land which had been occupied by San 
hunter-gatherers for thousands of years before them.55
The question of how Philippolis was acquired, alienated and eventually transferred to the 
Griqua would later attract the attention of outsiders. Kok II’s right to the land was not 
scrutinised (for the moment, at least). Instead, it was Philip who attracted criticism, for 
acquiring the land, then authorising the creation of the station, and ultimately handing it 
over  to  the  Griqua.  To  the  missionary  James  Archbell,  there  were  a  number  of 
unanswered questions about the lawfulness of title in Philippolis; as he framed them to 
the secretaries of the Wesleyan Society with which he was affiliated:
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What right had the Dr. to go into that country at the first and to claim possession 
there?  What  right  had  he  to  take  the  Griquas  there?  Who were  the  original 
proprieters  of  the  soil  as  claimed?  Did  Dr.  Philip  or  his  agents  purchase  it? 
Where are the documents?56
While it is true that competing missionary groups always sought new ammunition for 
their battles for the souls of native Africa, Archbell’s questions seem more than merely 
hyperbolical, as Andries Stockenström espoused similar astonishment at the transaction. 
Unlinked to any particular missionary group, Stockenström was a servant of the Cape 
administration, yet no less a settler – occasionally identifying himself as a ‘colonist’ in 
his correspondence.57 In February 1836, before an extensive Commission of Inquiry into 
the  treatment  of  indigenous  peoples  in  Britain’s  settler  colonies,  Stockenström  was 
interviewed on the matter by William Gladstone:
Are you aware whether the missionaries have taken possession of the country in  
the  name  of  the  London  Missionary  Society?—I  believe,  with  respect  to 
Philippolis, the thing has been done; I at least saw a paper to that effect given by 
Dr.  Philip,  or  in  his  name.  It  was  a  Bushman  establishment,  where  some 
missionary of the Society had established a mission under a Mr. Clark [...]
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Did that missionary take territorial possession of the place?—The establishment 
as  a  missionary  establishment  was  ceded  by  Dr.  Philip  to  the  Griquas.  The 
Griquas established themselves there,  and cultivated the soil,  and most of the 
Bushmen disappeared.
Do you mean that  the possession of  the soil  was ceded by Dr. Philip to  the  
Griquas from the Bushmen?—Yes, a paper was shown to me by Mr. Melville 
[sic] at the time I visited the place in 1830 or 1831.
Did you dispute the right of Doctor Philip on behalf of the British Government?
—Not at all. I said the Bushmen had a right to be there.
Were your remonstrances attended with any effect?—It is a Griqua establishment 
now.58
George  Grey  then  relieved  Gladstone,  and  seeking  clarification  on  some  of  the 
particulars, asked if Stockenström knew ‘whether Dr. Philip claimed a proprietary right 
to  the  site  of  Philippolis,  either  personally  or  on  behalf  of  the  society?’,  to  which 
Stockenström replied, ‘I do not know upon what grounds he claimed it, but he did the 
act, for I saw the paper’ – presumably referring to the same treaty of agreement which 
took place on 22 July 1826.59
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That Gladstone and Grey seem just as astonished as Archbell and Stockenström about 
the land question in Philippolis – if not, more astonished – is suggestive of how strange 
and irresponsible the transaction was regarded by the Commissioners of this famous 
Inquiry.60 
The scandal of Philip’s ‘proprietary right’ faded away soon after the Report was printed 
however,  presumably  because  the  Griqua  were  such  loyal  subjects  of  the  Crown, 
favoured at the time for their role policing the borders and collaborating with the Cape 
administration.61 From the  late  1820s  onwards,  it  would  only  be  white  settlers  who 
would  raise  the  issue;  though  they  would  do  so  not  to  discredit  the  LMS right  of 
alienation,  but  rather  to  dispute  the  Griqua’s  right  of  acquisition.  This  crucial 
development is considered in the next chapter. 
CONFRONTATION AND REMOVAL:
Meanwhile, back in Philippolis, tension between the ‘Old Inhabitants’ (as the station’s 
Bastaards and Khoekhoe were called), the San, and the incoming Griqua soon boiled 
over into violence. Kok II, laying the foundations of what he hoped would become a 
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mighty Griqua state, could only unite those he saw fit to become ‘Griqua’, and expel 
those he thought hindrances.
The ten years which followed 1827 was a period in which the ‘Old Inhabitants’ and the 
San would have very different experiences. Both, of course, had the option of removing 
with the LMS to their soon-to-be established Bushman Station on the Caledon River. 
But this was an option with little purchase among the ‘Old Inhabitants’, most of whom 
seemed, instead, to have assimilated into the Griqua community. The historian Robert 
Ross interprets this development as follows:
the old inhabitants merged quickly with the Griquas, for they had no cultural 
barrier before being assimilated. By 1834 they were cheerfully raiding alongside 
the Griquas and the !Kora. Naturally not everything went smoothly. There were 
clashes over their status, for they had been servants of the mission and were now 
subjects of an independent chief, but in general they were quickly incorporated, 
so  that  they  do  not  form a  recognisable  party  within  the  later  affairs  of  the 
Captaincy.62
Nevertheless, as Ross himself goes on to show, the two main factions within Philippolis 
would be the ‘Bastards’ and ‘Griquas’, right up to the 1850s, and probably beyond.63 
Ross’s point, it seems, is this: internal division there may have been, but these tensions 
never boiled over into anything more than rhetoric, and this must partly be due to the 
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talents of the Griqua Captains who were driven to keep the polity united through thick 
and thin.
Unlike the ‘Old Inhabitants’, the San, with a few exceptions, were considered unworthy 
of burgher rights in the Griqua polity however. Those who did not set off for Bushman 
Station in 1827-8 lingered about and waited for an offer of employment from Griqua 
settlers,  or  were  otherwise  expelled.  Many,  perhaps  most,  joined  up  with  semi-
independent bands in the outskirts of town to continue hunting and gathering as they had 
for  generations.  But  things  had changed in the last  hundred years  or so.  Game was 
seriously depleted. Slave-raiding – the commodification of San humanness as labour for 
the Boer economy – had become rife. Subjects loyal to the Griqua state of Philippolis 
had spread out over a large area of grazing land, and they moved their stock from place 
to place as ecological realities demanded without consideration for other usage patterns. 
To top it off, there was a serious drought in these years, by which time all of the springs 
had been taken by Griqua and trekboer settlers anyway.64 
The San of greater Philippolis,  who raided cattle as their  last  resort  for subsistence, 
became  a  nuisance  to  the  Griqua.  In  response,  almost  immediately  after  Kok  II’s 
acquisition  of  the  site,  Philippolis  became  a  base  from  which  a  number  of  deadly 
commandos  against  the  San  were  organised.  John  Melvill,  who  replaced  Clark  to 
oversee the transformation of Philippolis into a place unsafe for the San, describes the 
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situation well in his diary. In Melvill’s entry for 19 February 1827, he wrote of a Griqua 
commando that ‘went out in pursuit of the Bushmen who stole the cattle on the 9th inst. 
and  murdered  the  herdsman’.  The  bloody  details  of  the  commando  were  not  fully 
relayed to Melvill, but he recalls them returning in the morning the following day, ‘with 
eight Bushmen, including three boys’: ‘prisoners’ allegedly captured ‘without firing a 
shot’.  The  fate  of  these  captives  was  a  series  of  vicious  lashings:  probably  not  the 
Christian conduct Melvill expected to see displayed by the Griqua towards the former 
inhabitants of the greater Philippolis region.65
Just a few weeks later, Melvill reported a similar incident (though possibly it was the 
same one), in which a Griqua commando ‘went out against some Bushmen who had 
stolen three head of cattle and murdered the herdsman’. Two days later, on 17 March, 
‘The commando having returned home one of the party gave me the following account’: 
Having followed the footmarks of the Bushmen, they came upon the kraal, and 
found part of the meat, but the inhabitants had fled to a covert of thick reeds. 
They were followed and surrounded […] Some shots were then fired,  and it 
appears one of the Bushmen was killed, upon which the only two that remained 
made a most determined resistance, talking and swearing in the Dutch language 
at the Griquas, until at last they were shot with two women and two children that 
were with them.66
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[…]
It is not to be wondered at that [the San] would not give themselves up, for the 
usual  method  pursued  by  such  commandoes  against  them  must  leave  them 
ignorant of such a thing as giving quarter. O, when will the time come to favour 
this wretched people?67
Not any time soon, it would seem; their situation worsened, and their numbers fell away 
quickly.  ‘These  people  do  not  settle  themselves  near  springs,  make  permanent 
residences, or cultivate land’, lamented Stockenström, among the most sympathetic men 
towards the plight of the hunter-gatherers, in 1826. ‘[T]hey live in remote corners and 
rocks, and remove as often as they expect to find a part of the country more full of 
game’.68 For  Stockenström, an  influential  landdrost at  the time,  the solution was  to 
provide the remaining groups of San between the Karoo and the Orange River with 
colonial protection and cattle, in the hope that they might escape their woes (a policy 
first trialled by Governor George Macartney, in an early British Proclamation of 1798).69 
Instead, for all its fine intent, this solution failed; the Griqua and other pastoralists were 
jealous of the San’s stockpile, sentiment which likely led to many raiding offensives 
against the San.  
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‘In consequence of the Landdrost’s plan of giving cattle to the Bushmen’, Melvill wrote 
again from Philippolis in the winter of 1837, ‘66 men, women and children have arrived. 
It is remarkable that there is not one child to each family, there being only 17 to about 25 
families’. Their numbers were falling away. Melvill attributed this not to the violence 
systematically  inflicted  upon them by Griqua  and  other  stock  farmers,  but  to  other 
causes – ‘probably owing to several being in the service of the [white] Farmers, though 
indeed the few children generally found among the Bushmen may also be accounted for 
form their hard life and insufficient subsistence, and from their sometimes practising 
infanticide’.70 He  did  not  take  into  consideration  the  devastating  effect  of  Griqua 
commandos – some of which he reported in his diaries, others he may have had no idea 
about – but this should not be too surprising. It was important for LMS men to keep a 
clean  diary  with  respect  to  their  following,  for  their  diaries  were  never  completely 
personal and were often open to public scrutiny – and for this reason ought we approach 
the missionary archive with scepticism when it comes to the topic of San genocide.71 
By the end of the 1820s, the story was the same in the Transorangia as it had been in 
Beaufort West, Colesberg, and Graaff-Reinet. Most of the stock given to the San were 
either lost to raiders or consumed out of necessity, and their pitiful communities were 
perishing on the frontier – as a number of repetitive complaints to this effect, emanating 
from the farms of settling  trekboere in this period, testifies. The Cape administration 
responded to these warning signals; and early in 1830 it was Stockenström, promoted to 
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Commissioner  General  by  this  time,  who  was  given  the  job  of  investigating  these 
grievances.72
When he arrived in Philippolis, he heard from a few white settlers how the Griqua often 
chased down and massacred large kraals of San. The Griqua, for their part, did not deny 
such  claims,  but  rather  argued  that  white  men  often  joined  the  Griqua  in  their 
exterminatory raids. This tug-of-war between both concerned parties is reflected in the 
evidence  collected  in  the  Philippolis  annexure  of  Stockenström’s  ‘Commission  of 
Inquiry into Reports of Cruelty against Native Tribes Beyond the Orange River, 1830’, a 
harrowing catalogue of calculated genocide.73
Perhaps nowhere is the question of genocide more potently posed than in the testimony 
of
Johannes Coetze[e], in these years only embarking upon his vocal campaign against the 
Griqua of Philippolis.74 According to him, ‘a quiet and peaceable’ kraal was recently 
attacked by ‘a  party  of  Bastards  under  the  [Griqua]  Field Cornet  Abel  Pienaar  […] 
without the least provocation’. Recalling a conversation with Willem Barend, a Griqua, 
about the event, 
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I […] asked him why they act so cruelly towards the Bushmen, who had done no 
harm  –  he  replied  the  Bushmen  steal  our  Cattle,  we  are  determined  to 
exterminate them, so that our Cattle may graze unmolested day and night, and I 
asked him why they murdered the women and children, he said the children grow 
up to the mischief and the women breed them.
Just north of Philippolis near the Caledon River, Coetze also related to the Inquiry, lay 
‘the bones of many hundreds’ of San, ‘remnants of a wandering tribe’, whose murderers, 
he hinted, must have been the Griqua.75
Field-Cornet Schalk Burger, deflecting the charge of atrocities laid against him by the 
Griqua, likewise referred to a chilling conversation he had with a Griqua man: 
One Evening a Commando of Griquas passed my location […] I took [one of 
them] aside to my tent and asked him upon what principle he intended to act. He 
said ‘I will destroy all the Bushmen I meet with’.76
The  further  north  Stockenström  travelled  into  the  pastoral  domain  of  Griqua  and 
trekboere, the more people he encountered who were willing to make their complaints 
about the Griqua. A number of ‘Korana chiefs’ came forward, stating that ‘the Griquas 
have long made up their minds to exterminate the Bushmen; for the Bushmen are a great 
plague to them and to us’. Another Korana man of importance named Gatoo recalled 
75
7
 Evidence of Johannes Coetzee. CAD, LG/9.
76 Evidence of Schalk Burger. CAD, LG/9.
encountering Hendrick Hendricks out in the veld, where he ‘gave a full account of the 
Destruction of the Bushmen kraal, he mentioned to me all the People who went on that 
Commando. He did not  mention a Boor. […] Nobody could tell  why the kraal  was 
destroyed’.77 Further  towards  the  new Bushman Station,  Stockenström met  Herculus 
Jacobus Visser, who recalled another episode of Griqua violence. ‘On a Certain Sunday 
in January 1829’, Visser claims to have encountered
four Bushmen… [belonging] to a kraal situated near du Pré’s wagon […] [and] 
as we were thus engaged a party of Griquas came and departed. When we had 
finished, I heard that the said Griquas took the four Bushmen with them; next 
morning the Griquas attacked and destroyed the Bushmen.78
Two separate reports of Griqua inflicting massacres upon the San dominate the hearing. 
As Stockenstrom would summarise back to the Cape in March of 1830:
I had discovered that a kraal of Bushmen living among the migratory Boers, 
daily fed by, and assisting with these people, being perfectly peaceable and, as 
the Boers say, without the slightest shadow of bad intention on their part, were 
attacked by a Commando of Griquas of Dam Kok’s party, who killed fifteen, left 
two for dead badly wounded, and carried off the only survivors (three children), 
after offering them for sale to the farmers. 
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The manner in which the women had been put to death is too awful to be here 
related. In another kraal fourteen were killed by a party of Griquas under the 
command of Kok’s son-in-law, Hendrik Hendriks, and other outrages against the 
Bushmen were related, of which I have no proof.79
The Griqua side of the story differs slightly, and suggests – probably quite correctly – 
that white settlers played active roles in the elimination of the San too during this period. 
Abel Kok, a Griqua, even went as far to say on record that the trekboere often sponsored 
their commandos against the San.80 Hendrick Hendricks, for his part, confessed:
It is true that I went with a Commando against a kraal of Bushmen – they had 
stolen horses; but the Boors Sybiam [or Sybrand?], Bronkhorst, Thomas Botha, 
and Johannes Strydom went with us and fired on the Bushman as briskly as 
ourselves. Klaas Visser offered to purchase from us the Children which were 
saved; I told him that they were no slaves.81
‘Whatever foundation there may be for these mutual charges’, Stockenström concluded, 
‘it is clear that the greatest and most inveterate jealousy exists between the Colonists and 
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Griquas, about the possession or occupation of that part of the Bushman country, into 
which both parties have of late migrated’.82 But, so long as both parties were settled in 
‘that  part  of  the  Bushman  country’,  sheep  and  oxen,  not  the  San,  would  roam the 
beautiful pasture.
In 1836-7, at the same Commission of Inquiry in England, Stockenström would stick 
firmly to his beliefs that the San would soon be exterminated unless something was done 
to protect them from the Griqua and the white settlers. On top of this he claimed, as 
many settlers north of the Orange did as well, that the lands in dispute were ‘Bushman 
country’ and should be treated as such. Philip stuck firmly to his own beliefs too, and 
continued to downplay such claims of Griqua atrocities against the San. Sadly, it did not 
matter much in the end. Before long, the San of Philippolis and surrounds were, simply, 
no more.  Perhaps  no clearer  words to  this  effect  exist  than those of the Griqua Jan 
Pienaar, who, before the Commission of Enquiry into the Diamond Fields dispute of 
1871, provided this pithy summation of events: ‘Bushmen inhabited the country about 
Philippolis. We exterminated them, and Dr Philip gave the country’.83 
As I show in the following chapter, the Griqua, with this country that Philip notoriously 
‘gave’ them, would create a system of property relations that relied upon clever tenure 
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restrictions for the white Boers, who sought to assume control of the lands by any means 
possible.
CONCLUSION:
For a long time in colonial discourse, a great swathe of land to the north and the south of 
the Orange River was known as ‘Bushmanland’ or ‘the Bushman Country’. There were 
good reasons for this. The San were prominent there, and had been for longer than any 
other group. And they would become witness to an increasing number of upheavals, 
migrations and contests in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – developments that 
would drastically influence their complex relationship to that land.
The formation of an inclusive Griqua community on the Orange River resulted from a 
series of upheavals emanating from the Cape. Securing the support of the LMS, this 
community transformed into a number of miniature states. One such state was that of 
Philippolis, created after a breakaway faction from Griquatown, under the leadership of 
Adam  Kok  II,  was  given  dominium to  the  region.  But  this  grant  of  land  was  not 
sanctioned by any of the original San bands that had used the region for thousands of 
years; nor was it sanctioned by any of the LMS’s missionary subjects who had resided 
there from 1822. Rather, it was handed over in full by James Clark, on behalf of the 
LMS – a missionary organisation, it was argued later, which had no right to appropriate 
the land in the first place.
The San were a threat to the Griqua economy, and the Griqua were quick to eradicate 
them  from  the  Philippolis  region.  This  they  did  by  deploying  a  number  of  deadly 
commandos into the outskirts of Philippolis. It is quite possible that, as many of the 
Griqua would later admit, these commandos were organised in collaboration with white 
settlers.  Given  their  shared  interest  in  quelling  San  stock  theft  –  and,  taking  into 
consideration that white commandos had for fifty years beforehand campaigned against 
the San in nearby regions – this is easy to believe.84 But regardless of how and who 
sponsored these Griqua commandos, the devastating impact upon San society of such 
raids is inescapably clear. By the mid-nineteenth century, a once-thriving San population 
had vanished from sight around Philippolis.
Unsurprisingly, around the 1850s, terms like ‘Bushmanland’ and ‘the Bushman Country’ 
disappeared from usage. New communities – white, Griqua, Bastaard, Briqua (BaSotho, 
BaTswana), mixtures – had moved in and appropriated the land. The LMS and other 
missionaries  began  to  forget  about  the  Khoe-San,  turning  their  concerns  instead 
predominately toward other communities. The region was soon to be eclipsed by a wave 
of private interests, driven by a reckless tide of resource hunger. There was no place for 
any argument in favour of the rights of hunter-gatherers to land in this context.
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3.
THE GRIQUA LAND REGIME 
AND ITS CHALLENGES.
INTRODUCTION 
In the first fifteen years of Griqua Philippolis, Adam Kok II, and the most important of 
his successors, Adam Kok III, constructed a system of private ownership in land. This 
was a rather novel land regime at the time for all polities in this part of sub-Saharan 
Africa, and for it to persevere in the face of increasing white interest in the region, the 
Griqua  state  –  or  ‘Captaincy’ –  needed to  be  extensive,  bureaucratic  and respected: 
coherent to both the Cape Colony and Boer communities, and resilient in the face of 
serious challenge.85 
The Captain sat at the head of his  volksraad, a nominated council of varying size and 
influence.  The  raad would  come  to  decisions  collectively,  but  the  Captain  always 
retained a right of veto. Together, the Captain and raad codified laws and pencilled out 
their own land titles. Other executive roles included the  veldkornets, who performed a 
similar magisterial and policing role as the Boer officials of the same title did, and the 
kommandants, who also acted as police but were mostly in charge of organising military 
campaigns and commandos. 
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‘The social organization of the Griquas can be described as a democratic oligarchy’, as 
Ross puts it, and shows in his work however that its ‘democratic’ characteristics should 
not be overemphasised. This was a patriarchal system: no women held office of any 
kind, and it appears they did not vote either.86 Elections were quite rare too, and when 
they did occur, they usually involved members of the ruling dynasty – as had happened 
in 1836, when Kok II’s sons, Abraham and Adam, campaigned against one another; and 
although Abraham won this  particular  election,  the  steadier-headed Adam III  would 
eventually take the Captaincy from him in 1838, thanks more to help from his influential 
neighbour Waterboer than to democratic procedure.87
As I  argue  in  this  chapter,  the  most  important  creation  of  the  Griqua  Captaincy  of 
Philippolis  was  a  system  of  property  relations  which  sought  to  empower  Griqua 
landholders  and  restrict  white  tenants.  As  Kok  III  could  explain  it  to  the  Colonial 
Secretary in 1845:
Individual right of property is recognized by our laws, but no lands can be hired 
or sold among my own people without my consent, and it is contrary to our laws 
to sell land to any person not being a Grikwa subject. 
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I should not be able to alienate any portion of my territory without the consent of 
all my people, as such an act would require the change of one of our fundamental 
laws. 
[…] The more civilized part of my subjects reside with their families at separate 
farms;  others  who  do  not  possess  fountains  live  together  in  what  are  called 
‘werfs’ or ‘kraals’.88
An ingenious system organic to Griqualand, this land regime was developed by Griqua 
leaders with the specific conditions of the frontier in mind. But, importantly, because it 
was  based  upon  individual,  private  ownership,  it  was  also  cognisable  to  both 
imperialistic bodies of law that were important in South Africa in the nineteenth century, 
namely, the Roman-Dutch canon and the nascent English common law. Because of this, 
the Griqua land regime proved far more difficult to dissolve than, for instance, the San 
land regime was before it, or that of other neighbours at the same time.
From the late 1830s onwards, however, white farmers desirous of settling in the region 
instead of merely grazing in parts of it as they typically did beforehand proved to be a 
significant problem for the Captaincy. The onus was soon upon Adam Kok III to pass 
additional legislation and become increasingly autocratic in order to preserve the Griqua 
land regime, and enforce it over the pastures well beyond the boundaries of the former 
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mission station. He even called upon the help of the Cape government, which intervened 
(and very strongly), before stepping away from the conflict from the 1850s onwards. 
Below I show how the Griqua of Philippolis were overpowered, but my argument differs 
slightly  from  historians  before  me  who  have  focused  closely  on  Griqua-Free  State 
negotiations of the 1850s to describe how this happened. Rather, I want to place strong 
emphasis on an earlier period, between 1829 and 1848: a time when the white settlers, 
for all their divisions, stole the favour of the Cape administration. This they did, as I 
show below, by developing two distinct arguments that separately discredited the Griqua 
land regime from different angles. On the one hand, often the Griqua’s Boer competitors 
made reference to their own status as British subjects in order to argue for equal rights – 
in  particular,  rights  to  land  that  never  belonged  to  the  Griqua  in  the  first  place. 
Complementary to this kind of critique was the Boer community’s insistence that Kok 
III’s jurisdiction over land matters was inadequate and arbitrary. 
Deploying these kinds of arguments, the white settlers of Transorangia wore the Griqua 
land regime down by attrition, and won this political contest. After constantly pressing 
the Cape administration for self-government, they were granted the ability to replace the 
Griqua land regime with one of their own design. They had snatched sovereignty from 
the sickly Griqua state; and in the early 1860s they forced the stateless Griqua to relocate 
far away from the middle Orange River.
 
DEVELOPING A LAND REGIME: 
By the  middle  of  1826,  Adam Kok II  and  his  Griqua  subjects  had  taken complete 
possession of the mission station at Philippolis. It was not the case that ‘he and they 
were merely to have the use of the lands as belonging to a Missionary Institution’, as 
Philip hoped for a time.89 Rather, if anything, it was the other way around – as shown in 
the  previous  chapter,  the  Griqua  assumed  control  of  the  territory,  and  the  flimsy 
proprietary claims of the LMS (and, for that matter, of the San people) would never 
impede this development.
Taking note of their surroundings – millions of acres of quality grazing land, dotted with 
the occasional spring – the Griqua spread out, mostly to the north of the Philippolis 
settlement. They knew very well that sheep, however tasty, should not be used for food, 
but should rather be sent to market.90 The region was thus to be exploited to the fullest in 
the interests of sustaining a thriving pastoral industry. Melvill’s returns for Philippolis in 
1831 give a good indication of the Griqua economy after five years:
Population belonging to the station:
At station, Griquas: 6 males, 10 females, 16 children; Bechuanas: 120
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Outposts, Griquas: 868; Bechuanas: 840
Connected with station: total, 1860. The population of the station is rapidly 
increasing.
Cattle and implements, belonging to the Griquas: 362 horses; 4550 oxen, cows 
and calves; 14 200 sheep and goats; 45 wagons; 15 ploughs.
Belonging to the Bechuanas: 2100 oxen, cows and calves; 1200 sheep and goats.
Evidently,  these  ‘outposts’ were  quite  spread out.  Melvill  estimated  ‘the  territory  in 
possession of the Griqua in connection with this station’ at a whopping ‘3000 square 
miles’ – that is, 776,996ha, or just short of 2,000,000 acres.91 
The  extent  of  this  territorial  dominance  far  exceeded anything  achieved by  the  Old 
Inhabitants and the San. And the Griqua occupation was a different kind of occupation 
trialled by anyone before it. The Griqua state wished not only to make the land available 
for use as other communities had in the region, but also to assume sovereignty over it, 
and allow farmers to work their patches individually rather than communally. In this 
context, it became imperative for the Captaincy to protect Griqua interests in property 
for those settled away from the town. That stealing was a sin seemed, sadly for the LMS, 
insufficient deterrent to the Griqua, and the  raad passed a number of laws concerning 
chattel in the 1830s. Robbery (‘public stealing combined with violence) and theft (‘a 
secret and fraudulent deed and the withholding of another person’s property’) were to be 
punished  severely,  sometimes  with  death.  Inflicting  damage  upon  another  person’s 
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property, deliberately or ignorantly, was also criminal, but there was space for claims of 
negligence – a Griqua’s cattle were at all times to be maintained and contained properly, 
and if they were not,  a civil proceeding would ensue.92 Matters that were not easily 
resolved  came  before  regular  meetings  of  the  Philippolis  court,  where  veldkornets, 
Captain  and  raad would  balance  out  the  available  evidence  and  adjudicate  before 
adjourning at the end of the day.93
Equally  important  were  the  Griqua  laws concerning real  property  in  land.  After  the 
initial  Griqua  sprawl,  the  alienation  of  land  was  gradually  restricted.  With  white 
settlement slowly expanding all around – several families had been in the region before 
even the Griqua moved there, growing as they were gradually met by others – it was 
important  to  keep  Griqua  land  in  Griqua  hands.94 As  early  as  1828,  there  reputedly 
existed ‘a law against selling any of the lands’ in Philippolis, whether to Boer or Griqua. 
This seems to have been more convention than ‘law’ however, and though it was close to 
the  original  wishes  of  Philip  for  the  settlement,  the  situation soon turned out  to  be 
impracticable for Kok II. Logistically, the Captaincy in these years found it difficult to 
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monitor every plaatzen in the sparse settlement. Economically, it made little sense too, 
as the pastoral economy had become too dynamic to be restricted by a frozen land grid 
of use-rights. The ability to make improvements, to take on tenants, to downsize and 
alienate or to upsize and acquire more land became quite important for Griqua graziers 
in  the interests  of  securing maximum profit  in  this  period – just  as it  was  for their 
neighbouring graziers, the white trekboere.
Quite naturally, then, private property in land became attractive to the Griqua, who were 
keen to buy and sell their acres, as well as their wool. With the market in land starting to 
thrive,  however,  the  Griqua  community  faced  the  growing  threat  of  becoming 
surrounded by moneyed non-Griqua, and temptation to trade away land holdings grew. 
As Adam Kok III recalled in 1842, this development occurred beyond his control. ‘I 
warned the people against [selling land]’, he wrote to Philip, ‘but it was done privately 
and denied’.95 A solution had to be found.
Kok III had been Captain of Philippolis from late 1837 – by which time already there 
were perhaps over a dozen white settlers in the possession of dubious leases, a number 
of others with illegal freehold rights issued by renegade Griqua – and he would assess 
the  situation  with  sagacity.  A new  land  register  was  created,  and  regulations  were 
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tightened so as to place greater authority  in the hands of the Captaincy. From 1838 
onwards, no land could be alienated or sold unless it came with the explicit permission 
of  Captain  and  raad,  or  otherwise  the  transaction  would be  considered invalid.96 In 
effect, this new system allowed the Captaincy to favour Griqua burghers over any other 
type of settler. Kok III  now had authority to convey freehold tenure upon Griqua in 
measured  form,  but  completely  deny its  availability  to  non-Griquas  and  non-British 
subjects, instead issuing only short-term leases to them.97
Most if not all of the white settlers in the region sought freehold tenure; those leasing 
around  this  time,  while  frustrated  at  the  advantage  their  landlords  had  over  them, 
considered tenancy a necessary first  step before acquiring it.  For the most part,  they 
were the less republican type of Boer, who were disinterested – for the moment, at least 
–  in  raising  flags  in  Griqua  territory,  taking  the  land  by  force,  and  intimidating 
landowners (such as what Jan Mocke and his radical troupe were contemplating at the 
time, the likes of which are considered shortly below).98 On the contrary, these settlers, 
no more than a hundred families under the leadership of M. A. Oberholster, wanted to 
settle in the land as the Griqua had done; they saw the advantages of treating with them 
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and pledging loyalty at the same time to the Crown, which they did on, probably around 
the middle of June in 1840.
Although these settlers would eventually consider themselves better off for signing the 
documents,  the  content  of  the treaties  seemed to  strengthen the Griqua  land regime 
decidedly.  Those  who  had  settled  without  proper  leases  from Griqua  landlords  ‘are 
bound to state to the members of the community the number of years they have agreed 
on, and the sums paid for hire, and the possessors of the lands are bound to inform the 
Chief & Council  of their  having hired the said lands’;  and where settlers had come 
without making leases, ‘three successive years in all respects’ were allocated for a proper 
lease to be created with a Griqua.99 Importantly, whether by chicanery or ignorance (and 
probably the former),  the 1840 treaties said nothing about the Griqua law restricting 
complete alienation.
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Figure 2: An example of a Griqua lease.
No. 40. Kopjesfontein. 
Between Christian Kok (proprietor) and Jacobus Schalk van der Merwe (lessee)
‘Three Years was the common time’ for early leases, so claimed Philip in 1842.100 But 
the 89 receipts in the Griqua land register for the period between 1837 and 1842 reveal 
his misjudgement on the Griqua land regime yet again. There was, in fact, considerable 
variation  in  the  lease  periods,  which  were  commonly  set  up  to  twenty  years,  and 
sometimes even more.101 Freehold continued to be tightly restricted, however, and this 
quickly  concerned  the  white  settlers.  Though  there  was  a  handful  or  two  who  had 
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managed – at great cost, and against the wishes of the Captain – to secure freehold rights 
from individual Griqua secretly, most had failed to do so by this time.
At one of two meetings between Adam Kok III and the settler community early in 1843, 
this was the key grievance among many aired.102 As Johannes Coetze plainly put it to a 
colonial enquiry, ‘It is hard for us who are faithful to the Government to have no land’.103 
Another white settler, Abel Pienaar, made his point that
Our wish or object is not to dispossess the bastards of their country, but to be 
placed on an equal footing with them; – one of the bastards has five or six places 
for which they ask such extravagant prices, that we cannot afford to pay them.104
To this, John Hare the Lieutenant-Governor affirmed:
I cannot interfere with the Griquas in their hire of their lands; – but if you make a 
contract with a Griqua, I will oblige that Griqua to comply with that contract; at 
least, if any Chief does not attend to any lawful complaint, I will withdraw my 
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confidence from him but I will neither take from the Griqua their lands by force 
myself, neither will I furnish others to do it.105
This suited Kok III well, as he and the raad had been committed to issuing paper leases 
and keeping a land register since he took office.  This passage remains rather telling 
though, for whatever the Cape’s sympathies towards their allies the Griqua, they would 
always stand by the might of contract (and this posture would prove decisive later with 
the introduction of a magistrate-like ‘British Resident’ to Transorangia). These meetings, 
jam-packed with strong sentiments and settler arguments, are considered further again 
below. 
In the next few years, Kok III and the  raad, in consultation with the Cape Governor, 
considered it  necessary to restrict  not only the kind of occupation enjoyed by white 
settlers, but also the amount of land available to them. Eventually, and controversially, it 
would be ratified by treaty exactly which lands belonged to Griqua burghers, and which 
could be leasable to non-Griqua. According to Articles 2 and 5 of the Maitland Treaty of 
1846,
Captain Adam Kok engages to make hereby a division of this territory into two 
portions: one division to consist of land in regard to any part of which it shall not 
hereafter  be competent  for Captain Adam Kok or  any of  his  people to  grant 
leases, or make sales, or give any right of occupation […] and the other division 
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to consist of land which may be let on lease to British subjects and all others 
indifferently.
Philippolis  was  now  sequestered  into  a  leasable  region  and  an  unleasable  region. 
Importantly,  the  convention  of  leasing  continued  to  be  favoured  entirely  over  full 
ownership. In Article 38 of the treaty, those settlers who had ‘purchased or shall purport 
to  have purchased the absolute  dominion of  any landed property in  any part  of  the 
Griqua territory’ – that is,  those as the treaty put it,  ‘in direct opposition to the well 
known laws and customs of the Griqua people’ – were to have their titles ignored, and 
instead be furnished with forty year leases.106 On the surface, this seemed a pleasing 
result for the Griqua; however as I show below, the treaty marked the beginning of the 
end of their autonomy.
For over a decade before this, white settlers had been lobbying the Cape administration 
for land rights of their own in the Transorangia – a campaign worthy of our attention, 
now that  we  have  established  how the  controversial  Griqua  land  regime  worked  in 
Philippolis. The settlers pushed for the creation of their own polity, at the same time 
disputing the legitimacy of the Griqua state’s foundations in Bushmanland.
In the section that  follows,  I  show how the settlers  and the Griqua were constantly 
engaged in stubborn dispute, as each vied for the support of the Cape Colony’s official 
representatives. At the heart of this dispute lay a question about jurisdiction over land – a 
question that niggled away at the officials in the Cape government, who sought to extend 
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British control over the region as efficiently as possible, yet at the same time protect 
their allies, the Griqua. After 1845, the settlers had lost  their patience. No longer as 
polite with the Griqua in their transactions as they were formerly, they were more than 
ever at each other’s throats – and each group was calling on the Crown to step in and 
resolve the matter once and for all. 
CHALLENGES TO THE LAND REGIME:
It  took until the late 1820s for the colonial  government (or, to be more accurate, its 
variously  stationed  administrators)  to  take  proper  notice  of  the  conflicts  between 
different  parties  in  the  lands  to  the  immediate  north  of  the  Orange  River  around 
Philippolis. During Stockenström’s investigations of 1829-30, it was a claim commonly 
impressed upon him by white settlers ‘that they considered themselves entitled to that 
part  of  the  Bushman Country,  into  which  the  Boers  migrated  as  they  had  no  other 
Country to go to’.107 Stockenström had been occasionally sympathetic to the idea that the 
region was the original domain of the San, and following these enquiries, as we saw in 
the previous chapter, he would come to view the Griqua’s claim to the territory with 
increasing suspicion.108
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The  Griqua  were  never  ignorant  of  this  Bushmanland  argument.  ‘They  say  it  is 
Bosjemanland, and that therefore they have a right to occupy that country’, conceded ‘an 
Oppressed  Griqua’ in  an  open  letter  to  the  Cape  Governor  dated  14  August  1830, 
sourced  by  Karel  Schoeman from an  unidentifiable  colonial  newspaper.  The  Griqua 
continued: 
I say also that it is Bosjeman land. But, Sir, where is not Bosjemen land? From 
here all along the Great River to the great sea ocean is Bosjemen land, and Graaff 
Reinet and everywhere where the Boer resides is also Bosjemen land.109
This open letter is eye-opening, for it evidences perhaps the earliest Griqua engagement 
with  the  Bushmanland  argument.  It  was  probably  penned  by  the  Griqua  Hendrick 
Hendricks, but we cannot be sure. Regardless, it had no effect on the steady trickle of 
white settlers entering into the Philippolis region; ironically, ‘the Boer’ in question most 
likely would have probably agreed with the statement, as they saw themselves as a more 
permanent feature on the landscape than the hunter-gatherer San.  
G. A. Kolbe replaced Melvill as Philippolis preacher in 1831, and he would oversee an 
eventful period up to 1836, which featured significant intergroup fighting, a drawn-out 
leadership battle, and even a sex scandal featuring himself and the wife of a Griqua.110 
Probably the most pressing issue however was the problem of the white settlers, who 
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still clung onto their Bushmanland argument, most if not all of them loyal to the Crown. 
When Andrew Smith passed through the town in 1834, he recalled a charged meeting 
between Kolbe, Captain and raad, in which the attendant Griqua
complained bitterly of the farmers from the Colony being permitted to establish 
themselves upon their grounds, and dwelt strongly upon statements which had 
been made to them by the farmers touching their want of just claim upon the 
country of the Bushmen, on which account they wished it to be understood that 
they,  the  farmers,  were  as  much  entitled  to  use  it  as  the  Griquas.  They 
complained that the farmers appeared to consider them as in no way deserving of 
such a possession, and that they were in the habit of asserting that they were the 
children of the Government, and that therefore the Government was bound to 
consider  their  claim  to  the  Bushman  country  in  preference  to  that  of  the 
Griquas.111 
The issue of whose rights to San lands were stronger was never resolved before the 
Great Trek, and luckily for the Griqua, it would temporarily subside after 1837, when 
large numbers of  voortrekkers poured into the region.112 The Bushmanland argument 
would re-emerge later; in the meantime, the Boers were split into two main factions, 
each of which with their own strategies of securing individual property rights in land: on 
the one hand, there were those respectful of the Crown as the reigning sovereign order, 
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and on the other were those aligning with a radical settler  movement that sought to 
emancipate itself from the Crown. 
Oberholster and his loyalist community – many of whom residing around Philippolis for 
several years before the Trek – were happy to live alongside (though, it must be said, 
never together with) the Griqua of Philippolis. They sought to settle north of the town, 
many around the Riet  River valley, and so engaged individual  Griqua peaceably for 
leases and title deeds to that end. As it would later emerge after their ‘treaties’ of 1840, 
however, many of these settlers took up land in defiance of laws they neither understood 
nor respected – and this explains why they turned en masse to the Crown for support. 
Although it was confirmed to them in 1837, via Stockenström in fact, ‘that any Colonist 
entering the territory which the Griquas occupy must Submit to the laws and authorities 
which may be there established’, they nevertheless argued for the same property rights 
enjoyed by loyal Crown subjects of the Cape Colony south of the Orange River, using 
the safe and somewhat straightforward tactics of petitioning and treating.113 
In contrast  stood the more aggressive strategies of the republican settlers  to pry full 
dominium from the Griqua. These individuals, who were unconvinced of the legitimacy 
of British authority in the region, attempted to establish new  trekker republics in the 
interior and divvy out exclusive property rights irrespective of Crown or indigenous 
sovereignty. The key character in the Philippolis dispute was Jan Mocke, who moved 
back and forth between Natal and the Modder River, raising republican fervour among 
his  trekker comrades on each leg of the trip. In October 1842, he hosted an elaborate 
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ceremony of possession on the Orange River at Alleman’s Drift, where he and a few 
hundred armed followers planted a beacon and proclaimed the area as the south-westerly 
border  of  the  Republic  of  Natalia,  before  plundering Griqua farms  for  firearms and 
destroying  their  fields  of  corn.  The hardworking  magistrate  on  circuit  at  Colesberg, 
William Menzies, afraid of being outmanoeuvred by the trekkers, abruptly stepped in to 
annex the region for the Crown.114 At odds with Cape policy, however, his actions were 
immediately voided – the old days of marking a map and sending a note of explanation 
to  the  Cape  were  over.115 Kok  III,  a  little  rattled,  wrote  immediately  to  Mocke  to 
condemn  his  ‘discordant  and  unjust  behaviour’,  reminding  him of  the  Griqua-Cape 
alliance, and the two parties would get together for a brief and tense meeting where they 
would not agree to any real arrangement.116
Administrators in Cape Town took notice of these developments. With a view to gaining 
complete  control  of  the  region,  the  Governor  despatched  Lieutenant-Governor  Hare 
along with a number of troops to the northern Karoo town of Colesberg, just on the other 
side of the River from Philippolis for the summer of 1842-3.
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Extinguishing the threat of a republican coup was a top priority, which Hare was to do 
with a strong hand. Warnings were issued in a stern ‘Proclamation to the rebel Boers in 
Griqua Territory’, dated 2 January 1843. Should that ‘body of Emigrant Farmers, chiefly, 
if not wholly, composed of those […] at Alleman’s Drift’, ever again be ‘so reckless or 
so ill-advised as  to  persist  in  opposing  themselves  to  their  lawful  Government’,  the 
notice read, ‘it will be [the Lieutenant-Governor’s] painful duty to act with the utmost 
severity of the law’.117 That Hare issued this document flanked by a significant military 
presence seems to have silenced the Mocke contingent, but only for a year or two.
As for those settlers eager to secure land rights and remain loyal to the Crown, different 
strategies were required. Two meetings were arranged in Colesberg, reputedly ‘at the 
Request of Field Cornet Oberholster’. Hare would be there, as would Colesberg’s Civil 
Commissioner, Fleetwood Rawstorne; from Philippolis, Kok III was present, along with 
select members of his raad, and Peter Wright of the LMS; so too would there be a large 
number  of  white  settlers  eager  for  answers,  many  probably  with  voided  title  deeds 
scrunched up in their fists. It would be at these meetings, with several pairs of British 
ears unused to it, that the Bushmanland argument would be reintroduced into the battle 
for land rights around Philippolis.
The first person on record at these two meetings to scrutinise the Griqua right to the soil 
was not a  bona fide settler  but rather a German missionary from Bethanie,118 whose 
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sentiments were enough to raise Hendrick Hendricks, Kok III’s vociferous and eloquent 
secretary, from his seat:
The Farmers say, ‘The Griquas now occupy the Bushman’s land’. Who was it 
that  drove  us  there  in  the  first  place?  Let  the  names  of  ‘Kaapstadt’, 
‘Stellenbosch’, ‘Tulbagh’ give the answer. It was the Dutch people who sent us 
forward – it was not until later years, until the English name of ‘Coles Bergh’, 
was heard on the land, that the Griqua had rest. It was the English who made the 
Hottentot free. It was not until England put her hand on the land [that] was there 
any resting place for the Griquas – and never, never will there be security for the 
Griquas,  and the black nations of Africa, until England continues to hold her 
hand over the whole country.119
The argument made by the settler Johannes Coetze, however, could not be deflected so 
easily.  He  claimed  that  Stockenström advised  him to  ‘hire,  or  purchase  lands  from 
Bushmen beyond the Orange River, as a resource in reason of drought. He claimed to 
have done so in the year 1830, for himself and ‘the Burghers of his Field Cornetcy’.120 
Coetze claimed to have found a ‘Bushman captain’ called ‘Danster’, who had authority 
over  the  lands  around  the  Modder  River  (on  the  northern  reaches  of  greater 
Philippolis).121 ‘Adam Kok was not at Philippolis and the Bushmen were sole possessors 
of the land’, Coetze argued. Of course, Adam Kok II was at Philippolis at this time, as 
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Coetze was probably aware;  his  point  rather  seems to  have been that  the Captaincy 
lacked full control over lands this far north in 1830. 
Coetze’s argument was strong – though we have to look beyond the official minutes of 
the meetings  for  more details  about  it.  The  coverage provided in  the leading  settler 
newspaper  provides  a  different  picture  to  that  which  emerges  from  the  selective 
transcriptions. As the report in Grahamstown Journal ran:
The deputation maintained that the principal part of the country which the boers 
occupy, by right appertains to the boers, they having purchased it from the lawful 
proprietors, under the sanction of Government authority. A large tract of country 
was purchased by the field-cornet Coetze, and Piet van der Walt, from Danster 
and  Mandor,  two  Bushmen  chiefs,  for  about  8,000  sheep  and  500  head  of 
cattle.122
121
1
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leader Danster, who was marauding about these haunts since the end of the eighteenth 
century. This is a matter of which other researchers, it is hoped, will get decisively to the 
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These clipping are reproduced in Augustus F. Lindley, Adamantia: The Truth about the 
South  African Diamond Fields (London:  W. H.  & L.  Collingridge,  1873),  pp.  24-5. 
Lindley’s collection, a manifesto of documents supporting the right of the Free State to 
diamond-rich Griqualand, is a valuable resource, though the author is not without his 
settler  preconceptions,  and  he  bounces  around  different  regions  to  the  effect  of 
occasionally confusing the reader.
The  Cape  representatives  appear  not  to  have  been  persuaded  by  this  argument.123 
Unimpressed, Coetze and his partner van der Walt immediately set out to locate ‘Piet 
Krankuil,  a  Bushman chief’,  to  confirm the  legitimacy of  their  purchase.124 For  the 
moment, however, they would have a difficult time convincing anyone not a settler of 
the sale, and tentatively they remained on their properties awaiting more support. 
Just why Hare and Rawstorne were so immune to the Bushmanland argument is not 
clear. They were quite taken by Hendricks’ ‘Rule Britannia’-style of rebuttal, but there 
appears more to it than this.125 Surely not of ignorance, but rather we must suspect by 
choice in the interests of strategy, they saw the history of the region differently. ‘The 
ancestors of Adam Kok and his people were the original possessors of the soil and as 
such they have an undoubted right to govern themselves in their own lands’, stated Hare 
at the first of the meetings. ‘Adam Kok is now an independent Chief and the proprietor 
of the territory he now occupies, and he being an ally of Great Britain, the Farmers are 
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and Rawstorne’. Peter Wright to John Philip, 6 January 1843, cited in Ross, Adam Kok’s 
Griqua’s, p. 52.
bound to respect him as such – and they must do so’. For the moment, Kok III’s claim to 
Philippolis would be upheld, and never was the San question taken as seriously as, for 
instance, Stockenström had and continued to do. 
British protection was secured. Before adjournment, Hare turned to the Captain, with 
land on his mind:
I  applaud  your  prudence.  You are  right  to  defend  your  property  against  all 
lawless men, and as long as you are not the aggressors, I will help you; I have an 
army here, that shall protect you; I shall go to your land and see that you possess 
your rights, and when I go away I will leave a force there, sufficient to protect 
the innocent and punish the guilty.126
These  sentiments  –  vintage  rights  talk,  to  be  sure  –  capture  how  the  once  fully 
independent Griqua Captaincy was becoming increasingly reliant upon British ‘help’ to 
hold onto its land regime. Kok III, deep down inside, must have known this himself; 
indeed,  earlier  on in  the very same meeting  the  Captain admitted of  the difficulties 
exercising  his  jurisdiction  over  property  matters  –  that  ‘he  had  found  it  extremely 
difficult to keep them quiet and has only succeeded in doing so by promising to lay their 
case before the Government’.127 As we will  see,  this  difficulty  regarding jurisdiction 
would lead to a major turning point in Griqua-settler relations.
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Over the next two years, with the ‘rebel’ contingent re-emerging with vengeance and 
stirring up the community, policing Philippolis became near impossible.128 By March 
1844, Kok III’s inability to apprehend and try white settlers for breaching his liquor 
regulations led him to plead directly to the Governor:
if such proceedings are not instantly checked, Law will become powerless in the 
District of Philippolis; the Chief will be unable as bound by treaty to maintain 
order in his District, and neither life nor property will be safe, but become the 
prey of lawless men.129
The  following  month,  Hare  reassured  the  Captain  that  ‘all  Inhabitants,  Dutch  and 
English’,  that  came  into  his  territory,  even  ‘British  Subjects’,  ‘were  nevertheless 
amenable to [his] Laws’.130 The  de facto situation in Philippolis was very different to 
how Hare imagined it, however. Most white settlers ignored Kok III’s jurisdiction with 
contempt. For instance, in February 1844, Kok’s veldkornets attempted to apprehend a 
Boer called Van Staaden, ‘on a charge of assault of murder of an Englishman named 
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 The  new  strategies  of  this  contingent  resembled  those  of  Oberholster’s  –  they 
petitioned the Crown, organised meetings and corresponded with the Captain. Picking 
up on a bit of the Bushmanland argument perhaps, the fearsome trekker leader, Hendrik 
Potgeiter, would even write a polite letter to Kok III directly in 1844 insisting that ‘We 
are  emigrants  together  with  you  and  are  regarded  as  such  and  regard  ourselves  as 
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correspondence in CAD, GH 8/14, and Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas, pp. 55-6. 
129 Minutes of a meeting and enclosure to despatch to Sir George Napier, 28 March 
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Mills’, only to face a horde of armed settlers assembled at the Modder River with violent 
intent.131 
Another episode, with greater consequences, came with the attempted apprehension of 
Jan Krynauw in March 1845 over a labour dispute. When, after a hundred or so Griqua 
in pursuit of Krynauw grew impatient after riding all day, they took to harassing ‘Mrs. 
Kryno’ at  her home instead.132 This event – probably the most irresponsible conduct 
hitherto shown the settlers by representatives of the Griqua Captaincy – provided the 
spark  to  a  series  of  affrays  which  took  place  over  the  next  two  weeks.  Even  with 
Rawstorne’s intervention, initial diplomacy between the warring parties was fruitless, 
and they violently persisted until British troops in late April intervened on behalf of the 
Griqua to defeat the Boer forces.133
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 The following account comes from CAD, GH 8/14: ‘…an armed force of Bastards, 
about an hundred men, came down violently upon the house of Kryno; - as Kryno was 
not at home, but only a man named Jan Viljoen, they came up to Viljoen with the thumb 
on the  cock,  and  demanded of  him whether  he  would surrender  himself  or  not.  He 
announced, “I am willing”. Proceeding with him to the house of Kryno, Viljoen met Mrs 
Kryno, who was already surrounded by Bastards; - they then asked “Where is Kryno?” 
and received for reply Kryno is not at home, if he was, he would certainly come out. 
They then roared out on all sides – “Why don’t you beat her till she bursts”. Others said 
“put her in the flock and take her to Philippolis”, and “drive her out before the horse, 
then Kryno will come out”. After saying this, they violently stormed the house with the 
thumb on the cock, threw all the things bout, and calling out repeatedly “Kryno come 
forward, this is the day that your blood must flow”. They then took 3 guns, 2 bars of 
lead, and a bag of powder, 2 belts with powder and shot. After this the Bastards sent an 
armed man to fetch Mrs Kryno – this bastard repeatedly struck with a sjambok before 
the feet of Mrs Kryno while standing. When Mrs Kryno came into the house, the field 
Cornet Jan Dupre Griqua said to her, “you must stay here in the house, and I will remain 
also until Kryno comes.” Just then some travelling wagons were approaching, and a few 
horsemen. Whereupon the Bastards called out, “there comes the Commando of Boers”, 
and they departed with guns, powder, lead and belts’.
In  June,  Governor  Peregrine  Maitland  arrived  to  assess  the  situation  and  mediate 
between the parties. There were a number of negotiations about expulsions and cattle, 
which ultimately proved insignificant; far more important were the negotiations between 
Kok III and Maitland in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.134 At the heart of the 
Philippolis problem, as Maitland aptly diagnosed it, lay the pressing issue of jurisdiction 
that had bedevilled the Captaincy for years – in his opinion, a problem which needed 
solving just as much as the unresolved land question did. 
The treaty eventually entered into between Kok III and Her Majesty’s representative 
Maitland sought to address these issues. It offered some very satisfying securities to the 
Griqua – the most agreeable being the strict apportioning of territory into leasable and 
unleasable regions, and the prima facie support given to the anti-freehold convention, as 
we saw above – but,  of course,  all  of  this  came with a catch. That catch was Cape 
suzerainty. With complete consistency, British laws were now to be upheld alongside 
Griqua ones; and, critically, land disputes were to be taken off Kok III’s hands – ‘all 
questions  relating to the title  to  land or to  its  occupation,  whether raised by Griqua 
Subjects against British Subjects, or by British Subjects against Griqua Subjects’, were 
to be decided not by he and his raad as before, but by a permanently installed ‘British 
Resident’,  who possessed  a  kind  of  floating  jurisdiction  over  the  Transorangia  with 
almost full magistracy powers.135 
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CAD, LG/373. See also the collection in CAD, GH 8/14.   
134 For the lead-up to this event and its aftermath, see Ross, Adam Kok’s Griqua’s, pp. 
56-62.
Though  the  treaty  was  not  officially  ratified  until  February  1846,  its  important 
conditions  were  effective  immediately.  In  the  months  following  August  of  1845, 
Rawstorne  established the  office  of  Resident  (or  ‘special  magistrate’ as the job was 
sometimes also called), and was soon met by Captain William Sutton, who arrived to 
assume the position of Resident at Philippolis. A few test cases were run, before Sutton 
issued a public notice on 12 December making clear to Boer and Griqua his availability 
to hear particularly cases regarding property that might be settled quickly.136 In the space 
of  five  weeks,  several  dozen  cases  were  heard  in  the  court.  Disputes  regarding 
improvements,  stock  numbers,  the  length  of  leases,  and  multiple  owners  –  disputes 
sometimes as old as fifteen years – were quite commonly presented before the Resident. 
Though Griqua burghers tended more commonly to be the opportunistic plaintiffs, most 
of the time Boer defendants provided appropriate documentation to escape and receive 
security of tenure for another few years.137 The advice given to the settlers in 1842-3, to 
defer to the irrepressible power of contract, was heeded.
The Resident’s court packed up in February, and removed to Bloemfontein by the end of 
March,  where  it  would  be  stationed  permanently,  busy  mostly  with  Moshweshwe’s 
concerns. On the surface, it does not appear to have been very successful in Philippolis. 
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White settlers often showed contempt of it.138 Sutton seldom ruled as often as he might 
have, and from the correspondence he kept with Cape Town, he seemed to have no idea 
about the boundaries of Philippolis, and so struggled to uphold the distinctions between 
leasable and unleasable, and between who was allowed to own outright and who was 
not.139 The court’s importance should not be underestimated however, for it had made the 
Captain’s job redundant. Kok III was often witness to the hearings, but he was distanced 
from decision-making. Thus, however badly he struggled exercising it beforehand, he 
had, after late 1845, completely lost his authority over land matters. 
This was a win for the white settlers: the tables had started to turn in their favour in 
Griqualand. What followed this development, as I show in the final section below, was 
the destruction of the Griqua land regime. The Griqua Captaincy steadily lost much of 
its influence in the region, becoming weak at  the bargaining table by the end of the 
1840s. At the same time, the Boers seemed to win the favour of the Cape government’s 
new representative, Sir Harry Smith, who offered the settlers an invitation to expand and 
improve in the Philippolis region – and receive protection for it.
DESTRUCTION OF THE LAND REGIME:
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 As, for instance, in the case regarding Matheus Jacobus Oosthuisen, who stormed 
out of the room, without settling over the farm Knoppies Fonteyn, ‘taking with him at 
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In  1846  and  1847,  the  Captain  was  virtually  powerless  to  do  anything  as  tensions 
regarding land continued to froth over into strong words and threats of violence. These 
were  trying  years  for  the  Cape  administration  as  well.  The  Transorangian  conflict 
featured Moshweshwe’s BaSotho, scatterings of angry Boers, and several Griqua polities 
(not just the one governed by Adam Kok III), and it was a very pressing issue. But there 
were other urgent matters. War with the amaXhosa in the eastern Cape had flared up 
again in 1846, and this was keeping many British troops occupied; small pockets of Boer 
republicanism across the highveld and in Natal were threatening to do the same as well. 
Into this context stepped Sir Harry Smith.
Smith’s appointment as Governor in 1847 marks a key turning point in Cape policy, as 
historians agree without exception.140 Whatever else may be said of his bold strategy and 
rough diplomacy, he was, as Timothy Keegan describes him, ‘a more settler-oriented 
governor’ than those who preceded him.141 North of the Orange, this was certainly the 
case;  as  Ross  writes,  Smith  had  the  interests  of  ‘the  disaffected  Boers’  at  heart, 
‘concerned above  all  to  woo  them’.142 After  brief  enquiries  into  the  troubles  of  the 
region,  he  later  organised  a  meeting  at  Bloemfontein  with  Kok III  and  his  raad in 
January 1848. More an ambush than a meeting, angry words and threats of death were 
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reputedly hurled around the room.143 Smith had plainly resolved to disregard previous 
Griqua policy, and decided to set a new course for Philippolis. If not by force, then out 
of considerable intimidation, Kok III’s hand signed a treaty with Smith. The terms of 
which were far  worse than any other to which he had previously consented. So this 
‘treaty’ ran:
That as the leases under which British subjects now hold land in the inalienable 
territory expire, all such subjects shall be bound and obliged to quit that territory 
on  receiving  payment  from  the  Griquas  of  the  value  of  the  buildings  and 
improvements made by them on such lands […]. In the event of the Griquas 
being unable to pay the amount of the valuation aforesaid, at  the time of the 
expiry of the lease, the lessee shall be entitled to retain possession of the property 
at an annual rental […] until the payment be made, or until the annual rental 
(which the lessee shall  in that case be entitled to retain) shall  amount to the 
valuation aforesaid.
Kok III could not afford to pay for the improvements made by those settlers situated in 
the reserved area;  nor  should he  ever  have  expected to,  as  most  settlers  were  there 
contrary  to  the  Maitland  Treaty  and  Griqua  land  regulations  (neither  of  which  said 
anything about improvements).144 As for ‘the farms leased now only for forty years in 
the alienable territory’, they were to remain let ‘in perpetuity’, in exchange for an annual 
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payment of £300 from the High Commissioner to Kok III. With this, Smith had reversed 
the  terms  of  the  Maitland  Treaty  regarding  settlers  who  claimed  to  have  acquired 
freehold from the Griqua, remarkably, by making it the Cape exchequer’s job to pay for 
the rental payments of settlers, who were now granted de facto freehold.145
A close inspection of Smith’s language of tenure reveals how, somewhere in the period 
between  Sutton’s  time  at  Philippolis  and  early  1848,  the  Griqua’s  most  important 
assurances in the Maitland Treaty had changed meaning, courtesy of a rather unfortunate 
mistranslation.  The  terms  ‘leasable’  (huurbaar)  and  ‘unleasable’  (onhuurbaar), 
travelling  back  and  forth  between  creole  Dutch  and  administrative  English  as  they 
necessarily had to, became wrongly construed in official discourse to mean  alienable 
and inalienable, as clearly evidenced by Smith’s wording above. As a result, hereafter, 
the Griqua land regime was commonly misunderstood by even those most sympathetic 
towards  their  plight.146 The  truth,  that  not  just  a  portion  but  the  entirety of  Griqua 
145 Government Gazette no. 2204, 24 February 1848. Original date of treaty was 24 
January 1848. 
Reproduced  in  Schoeman,  Griqua Records,  pp.  106-7.  As  Rev.  William Thompson, 
sympathetic  observer,  put  it:  ‘in  that  division  of  their  country,  termed the  alienable 
territory, comprising about 300 farms, were some which had been leased for 40 years, 
and others, not yet leased or which, if leased at all, were for much shorter periods, viz., 
for 20, 15, 10, and 5 years respectively. Sir H. Smith, by his mere fiat,  and in open 
violation of the faith of treaties and of the rights of private property, converted all leases 
of  40  years’  duation  into  freeholds,  and  then,  still  further  to  favour  the  Boers,  he 
extended all leases to 40 years; and Captain Adam Kok was intimidated to sign a fresh 
treaty, which was to ratify this act of injustice’. William Thompson, A Word on Behalf of  
the Down-trodden in South Africa (Cape Town: Saul Solomon & Co., 1854), p. 6.
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242-57; Thompson, Word on Behalf  of  the Down-trodden,  pp.  3-4. See also William 
Thompson, The Griquas, as “Her Majesty’s Special Commissioner for the Settlement of  
the Affairs of the Orange River Sovereignty” Found Them, and As He Left Them: A  
Chapter for the History of Our Dealings with Weak Tribes (with appendix) (Cape Town: 
Saul Solomon & Co., 1854), p. 6.
Philippolis  was  conditionally  inalienable  since  1838,  seemed  lost  on  non-Griqua 
newcomers,  settlers  and  officials.  In  many  respects  similar  to  the  contemporaneous 
tragedy faced by the Maori of New Zealand’s North Island – who would discover all too 
late that the English version of their  Tiriti o Waitangi had curtailed property rights far 
more than they expected it would, extinguishing their sovereignty to boot – the Griqua 
seem here to have been outdone by an official mistranslation, one that crept perniciously 
into settler discourse.147
Smith, far more sympathetic to settler complaints than any of his predecessors, seems 
also to have been taken by the Bushmanland argument. Departing with the likes of Hare 
et al. – who considered the Griqua ‘Natives’, completely indigenous to the Orange River 
valley – Smith was the first official since Stockenström to be sceptical of their rights to 
the territory, but he was certainly more blunt and partial about it. ‘I must here assure 
your Lordship’, penned Smith in response to a complaint lodged to Earl Grey at the 
Colonial  Office  in  May 1850,  ‘that  Captain  Adam Kok and his  followers  are  mere 
squatters, and have no more hereditary right to the country in question than the Boers 
themselves, who have been in the habit, for many years, for the sake of pasturage, of 
driving their herds and flocks over the Orange River’.148 Finally it would appear the 
claims  of  Johannes  Coetze  and  others  were  taken  seriously;  more  than  that,  this 
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argument had now been taken up in officialdom, affecting no doubt how many perceived 
the question of land rights in Philippolis thereafter. 
Within a few days of the treaty, Smith annexed the Transorangia, and Philippolis was 
engulfed by a British-ruled sea called the Orange River Sovereignty.149 White settlers, 
now  liberated  to  ignore  Griqua  land  regulations  and  the  distinctions  made  in  the 
Maitland Treaty, circulated about Philippolis in great numbers, and many acquired land 
privately, without the Captain’s consent. British Resident after British Resident, however 
sympathetic to the Griqua they were, had become disinclined to intervene directly on 
land  disputes,  and  were  besides  stuck  in  Bloemfontein  residing  over  the  entire 
Sovereignty.150 They  stood  away  from the  Griqualand  question,  issuing  warnings  in 
public  and  title  deeds  in  private,  until,  after  a  few  years,  their  jurisdiction  became 
superfluous too.151 In the meantime, forty year leaseholds had become the norm rather 
than the exception in the ‘alienable’ territory, which is difficult to explain. Ross puts this 
down mainly to the Resident’s misinterpretation of the Smith treaty, though one also 
suspects  that  the  settlers  themselves,  pre-empting  full  freehold  and relieved that  the 
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that Territory; Together with a Brief History of the Griqua Nation  (Cape Town: Saul 
Solomon & Co., 1875), pp. 330-3.
Griqua  law  against  alienation  was  seemingly  voided,  opportunistically  emerged  in 
greater numbers than before to claim they had purchased from individual Griqua.152
For all the individual Griqua who had sold land to white settlers illegally before 1848 – 
and, much as Kok III was distressed to admit it, there were quite a few – it seems that far 
more did so in the 1850s. The tables had turned on the Griqua; now, their property rights 
were the ones imperilled, so many sold their land as security, if against the Captain’s 
wishes.  The  distinction  between  ‘alienable’ and  ‘inalienable’,  erroneous  in  the  first 
place, soon vanished into thin air, as land sales took place irrespective of it, increasing 
with the announcement that the British were making plans to abandon the Sovereignty to 
be left to the Boers seeking semi-independence.
 
Robert Ross, who has painstakingly analysed the details of the Free State land registers, 
provides in his book an excellent account of the 1850s land rush, which saw the vast 
majority  of  Griqua land fall  into settler  hands.  He notes  how sales peaked in  1854, 
reflecting both a greater propensity to sell during the transition into the ‘Orange Free 
State’ and the  establishment  of  a  new (settler)  land registry  in  Bloemfontein.153 The 
numbers that he gives, while only covering those on record, are startling. A small trickle 
of recorded sales occurred in the early 1850s, until a sharp peak of 70 recorded sales 
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cites a letter from Kok and Council to Smith, 22 Feb 1848, in GH 22/3, which I could 
not find at that location. See Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas, pp. 81-2. 
153 Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas, pp. 81-93. 
occurred for the year of 1854 alone. Over the next six years, 153 Griqua farms would be 
sold to Boers.154
Adam Kok III, still Captain of the Griquas, was dealt no favours during the Free State 
period. The Cape government, who had reneged on the Maitland Treaty so spectacularly 
within just two years of its framing, stepped away from the conflict in the mid-1850s 
and left it to the Boers to resolve (or rather, as they seemed more inclined to do, sweep 
under their all-white constitution). Kok III’s subjects, under pressure from the settler 
regime, disrespected his land regulations in the interests of their own self-preservation. 
His  jurisdiction  was  slashed  by  President  Boshoff  in  1857,  restricting  it  ‘only  [to] 
Griquas  and other  coloured  people’ in  ‘the  inalienable  territory’.  The boundaries  of 
Philippolis, previously manipulated by the Captaincy for its benefit, were finally worked 
against  the  Griqua,  dispossessing a  number  of  burghers  from their  properties  in  the 
process. Things only got worse for Kok III. In good faith he gave power of attorney to a 
settler called Henry Harvey, who evaluated the land irresponsibly, and jeopardising its 
value, whetted the appetite of settler capitalists at the same time. When eventually the 
Captain was  cornered  into  signing  a  treaty of  cession in  1861,  the  Griqua  had few 
options left.155 He accepted compensation and looked to the British; the only offer they 
made him was a strange one: ‘a tract of unoccupied country lying on the south-east side 
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 Figures come from the records of known sales from the Orange Free State archives, 
appearing as Appendix 2 in Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas, p. 140.
155 For  this  chain of events,  see Ross,  Adam Kok’s Griquas,  pp.  94-103;  H. J.  van 
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of the Drakensberg’, hundreds of kilometres away.156 This was Mpondo land, in recent 
dispute with Nehemia’s breakaway BaSotho – never mind the classic colonial discourse 
of vacant land, this was not ‘unoccupied country’.157
Removing to a strange place could hardly have been among Kok III’s ambitions in 1838, 
but by the end of 1850s, his arm was twisted. Selling whatever they could, Kok III and 
around 2,000 followers left the Free State for a new start elsewhere.158 Over the next two 
years, they made new enemies, and had lost most of their stock; in ‘Griqualand East’ 
they finally arrived ‘an impoverished and demoralised people’, as Ross puts it.159 
CONCLUSION:
Philippolis became Griqua country in 1826, and the rich grazing lands around it became 
pasture for their stock, though the kind of tenure enjoyed by these farmers beyond the 
boundaries of the old station was never clear. Early on,  the Griqua Captaincy under 
Adam Kok II put into place a few piecemeal measures in order to preserve the Griqua 
right to property in land and things, but it was not until the reign of Adam Kok III after 
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1837 that a comprehensive land regime, protecting individual Griqua interests in land 
and  restricting  non-Griqua  ownership,  would  be  installed  and  regulated  in  greater 
Philippolis. 
This special land regime was put together out of necessity. White farmers, their numbers 
growing from the late  1820s onwards,  also sought pastures and somewhere to settle 
north of the middle Orange River and disputed the Griqua’s right to monopolise the land. 
The Griqua’s position in the Philippolis region was never secure, and sadly for them, it 
became more and more insecure as time went on. A tense battle between the two parties 
ebbed and flowed throughout the 1830s and 1840s until, during the period of the Orange 
River Sovereignty, Kok III’s jurisdiction over land matters became weak to the point of 
non-existence – much to the celebration of the settler cohort steering the Sovereignty’s 
successor state, the Orange Free State, from 1854 onwards. 
I have argued here that the disregard shown the Griqua land regime may largely be 
attributed to two powerful arguments that circulated through settler discourse. The first 
of  these  arguments  queried  whether  or  not  it  was  fair  that  the  Griqua  had  become 
ultimate landlords of the region. It was the San and not the Griqua who were the original 
possessors of the land, argued some of these Boers – though, quite cleverly, they did not 
argue  as  much  in  order  to  advance  San  claims  to  greater  Philippolis  (which  most 
believed to have been well and truly annulled by the 1830s). Rather, they did so in order 
to advance their own claims.160 Others pointed out that as both the Griqua and the Boers 
were loyal British subjects by consequence both should receive the same rights in the 
region.  With  these  claims,  not  only  the  Captain’s  capacity  to  discriminate  between 
potential  landholders,  but  also the very foundations  of  their  tenure,  were called into 
dispute. 
The other, main settler argument attacked the Griqua from another angle: it identified the 
maladministration of property matters and the ineffectiveness of Kok III’s jurisdiction in 
the region. White settlers refused to become Griqua subjects; they showed contempt of 
their court and ignored their laws. But they held onto their lease agreements and dubious 
freehold  receipts,  making  it  clear  to  colonial  administrators  whenever  they  had  the 
opportunity that the Griqua were never good enough at bookkeeping to act as the sole 
land register over such a great terrain. 
Once the currents of settler debate had become triumphant in officialdom – first British 
Residents piled in and then Harry Smith overturned Kok III’s land regulations – the 
Philippolis Griqua became powerless and marginalised. Griqua sovereignty had been 
unseated by settler sovereignty. Their options depleted, the Griqua were quick to leave 
the  Orange Free  State  and start  afresh somewhere  else.  Their  experiences  after  this 
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period were unpleasant, and never again did their Captaincy boast as much influence as 
it did during their time at Philippolis. 
Though out of sight in the populous Transkeian territories, the Griqua people remained 
resilient enough to see the rise and fall of apartheid.161
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4.
THE ERASURE OF PAST INTERESTS IN LAND AND THE CREATION 
OF AFRIKANER ORANIA.
INTRODUCTION:
This chapter, and the one after it, explore the same issues as the two chapters on the 
Griqua people of Philippolis. Here, I describe how several claims to the land of (what 
would after 1991 become) Afrikaner Orania, have developed over the course of South 
African history, from colonial annexation to the present-day period. This is a narrative 
similar to that which precedes it, and indeed, similar to many that can be recounted of a 
number of South African contexts – about dispossession and removal, about the means 
by which claims to property have been espoused over time, about power and who has it.
At the outset, I introduce the political dilemmas faced by the Afrikaners of the 1980s. 
Then I provide a legal-historical background to lands in and around Orania, from earliest 
times up to its purchase in 1991. Before concluding, I call upon a number of sources to 
reproduce a significant event in the history of the region – the moving in of Afrikaners, 
and the erasure of past interests in land.
POLITICS:
But who are the Afrikaners? They are white South Africans, who share an affinity with 
the  Afrikaans  language;  most  identify  with  some  aspect  or  another  of  Afrikaner 
geskiedenis, and many subscribe (or have, at one time, subscribed) to the ideals of a 
Protestant/Calvinistic worldview – but beyond these generalisations,  much as writers 
often try, it  is  difficult  to pigeonhole them. The descendents of  Dutch,  German and 
Huguenot settlers from the early days of  Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) 
occupation, they are and always have been the predominant white settler community in 
South Africa, although they have never been a homogenous group. Theirs is a history 
intriguingly replete with internal political divisions: starting with those between those 
who stayed at the Cape and those who trekked in the 1830s and 1840s, the lojaliste and 
republikeine  in the later nineteenth century, between  Afrikanders  and  Hollanders, and 
later  bittereinders,  hensoppers and  joiners in the post-Anglo-Boer War reconstruction 
period, and then with the  verkramptes  and  verligtes in the ranks of the National Party 
and the Broederbond, and so on it has gone up to the present.162
Apartheid was close to the hearts of many Afrikaners. After several attempts to preserve 
the regime by the National Party miserably failed – bearing, as they did, the brunt of 
international  condemnation  at  the  time  –  an  ‘extra-parliamentary  solution’  was 
brainstormed  by  certain  segments  of  the  Afrikaner  community.  The  preservation  of 
political  autonomy,  culture  and  language  were  the  foremost  concerns  among  these 
Afrikaners; and several organisations – cultural movements, political parties, pressure 
groups and others – began to throw around the idea of a separate volkstaat.163
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 The most accessible and comprehensive history of the Afrikaners is, and probably 
will remain for some time, Herman Giliomee,  The Afrikaners: Biography of a People  
(London: C. Hurst, 2003).
Amid  the  many  negotiations  associated  with  the  transition  from  apartheid 
segregationism into democratic integrationism, a number of different  volkstaat  designs 
were explored.  These  were  optimistically  hoped  by  many  right-wing  Afrikaner 
nationalists to be installed in the Cape, the Free State, and the old Transvaal (across parts 
of  what  are  today’s  Mpumalanga,  Gauteng,  Limpopo,  and  the  Northwest  Province), 
comprising a  number  of  Afrikaner-only pockets not  too dissimilar  in  concept  to  the 
fragmentary  Bantustans  formerly  stitched  into  the  landscape.  Some,  like  General 
Constand Viljoen and the  Afrikaner Volksfront he co-launched in 1993, were regularly 
engaged in a number of discussions about the development of an ANC-permitted and 
constitutionally  sanctioned  volkstaat (even  insisting  upon  the  volkstaat as  an 
‘indigenous’  right);  others  were  more  radical,  among  them  members  of  Eugene 
Terre’Blanche’s  Afrikaner  Weerstandsbeweging,  who  avoided  polite  diplomacy  and 
threatened to secede from the South African state through violent means.164 
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Among the least threatening  volkstaat designs to emerge in the late 1980s and early 
1990s was that developed by the Afrikaner theologian Professor Carel Boshoff III, who 
sought to develop a small settlement in the Northern Cape. Conveniently for Boshoff, 
Orania, a small, dilapidated, and seemingly empty town (or ‘dorp’) in this region – just 
over 100km downstream (north-west) from Philippolis, on the other side of the Orange 
River from it – had come onto the market in 1989, and was perfect for his  volkstaat 
project.  Before  long,  a  private  company  comprising  of  fifty  stakeholders  was  put 
together (Orania Bestuurdienste), and the town was bought on its behalf by Boshoff in 
1991.  Ultimately,  only  this  volkstaat  would  survive  into  the  post-1994,  ANC-ruled 
context.
LAND:
Orania was initially created by the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) in 1964. Well 
before this, however, the area had been part of that ‘Bushman Country’ shared by the 
San for thousands of years, and later, pastoralist Khoekhoe around the valley, along with 
southwardly sprouting Sotho-Tswana groups to the immediate north. 165
The land sat on the periphery of the Dutch colonial domain during the days of VOC rule. 
Far away to the north-east, as it was, from the main entrepôt settlement of Kaapstad, the 
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 Evidence of stone-age occupation can be traced back tens of thousands of years, but 
an abundance of rock art in the greater Orania region, depicting game animals in a style 
concurrent with other Bushman engravings across Southern Africa,  provide the most 
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region was of little interest to the company-state. Within a few decades of the British 
period of  rule  at  the Cape,  however,  things  changed.  Between 1822-1824,  the Cape 
administration, persuaded by Andries Stockenström, extended the colonial border from 
where it previously was (just north of Graaff-Reinet) up to the middle Orange River and 
running along it,  until  curling away inland to the south-west after  ‘die Groot Draai’ 
(skirting  underneath,  but  not  encompassing,  present-day  Orania),  towards  the 
Kareeberg.166 With the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act of 1836, an even larger area 
up to the Orange River came within the ambit of the Cape Colony’s jurisdiction; and just 
over  a  decade  later,  on  behalf  of  the  Crown,  Sir  Harry  Smith  officially  extended 
Stockenström’s old borders up to the point where the Orange River met the Vaal River, 
and created the ‘Orange River Sovereignty’ to the north, effectively transforming the 
Transorangia into an appendix of the Cape Colony.167 Though the period was a bloody 
one, there were no wars of conquest per se; there were a few treaties, but none (even at a 
stretch) could be considered a legitimate diplomatic transaction of cession; there were 
some brief consultations with some of the region’s chiefs and leaders, but many others 
were simply ignored. In many ways, by Smith’s actions, the middle Orange River valley 
(or, to be more accurate, patches of it) was treated something like a terra nullius – that is 
to say, the land had no independent  proprietors, but rather had inhabitants, and they 
were treated as Crown subjects.
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The  tribes  and  communities  in  the  vicinity  of  the  middle  Orange  at  the  time  of 
annexation, while still quite independent, were severely weakened by the violence of the 
frontier  era  and  the  depletion  of  game,  which  probably  explains  Smith’s  wanton 
ignorance of them. There were some exceptions in the mid-nineteenth century, however. 
The main of these were, of course, the Griqua states, Griquatown and Philippolis, which 
Smith struggled to muscle into submission; but by the 1880s, the tide had turned against 
even  these  formidable  communities.  Direct  British  colonial  sponsorship  –  like  that 
which Moshweshwe secured for his BaSotho north of the upper Orange River – seemed 
to be the only way for indigenous communities to remain politically coherent in this 
period, and such opportunities became increasingly rare. Economic opportunities had 
vanished too: white communities on either side of the Orange River had taken control of 
beautiful lands and rich deposits of mineral resources – they would ultimately mix these 
treasures  with  migrant  labour  to  entrench  their  own wealth  in  the  region  –  and  an 
exclusivist  economic  system  developed,  for  which  South  Africa  would  later  earn 
notoriety.
This situation was seemingly apparent to a settler called Stephanus Vermeulen, who in 
1882 purchased a giant riverside property called ‘Vluytjeskraal’, taking up a large chunk 
of  what  was  then  the  Hopetown  District  of  the  Cape  Colony.168 This  was  done  in 
freehold tenure, according to the regulations established by the Cape at the time: his 
individual right to the property – an exclusive right that restricted indigenous access or 
use – was now protected by colonial law. But securing this right was not cheap. The 
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property  reputedly  cost  Vermeulen  a  whopping  £3952,  proving,  firstly,  just  how 
impenetrable  the  market  in  land  had  become  for  individuals  unversed  in  the  cash 
economy and private accumulation by this time, and suggesting, secondly, a degree of 
speculation-induced inflation amid the incipient diamond rush that was taking place just 
150km  to  the  north,  in  Griqualand  West.169 ‘Settler  capitalism’  had  arrived  in 
Transorangia, it seemed, for which non-settlers were ineligible.170
Much  of  the  land  remained  in  the  Vermeulen  family’s  hands until  1950,  when 
‘Vluytjeskraal was sold for £5 per morgen to Gideon Botha’.171 Just over a decade later, 
a small portion of the property – ‘2769ha, comprising portions 2 and 5 of Vluytjeskraal 
149 and Portions  of  Annex Vluytjeskraal  151’ –  was scouted by the  National  Party 
government as a potential site for the Orange River canalisation and damming project in 
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the mid-1960s.172 This was a calculated and well-publicised project, and it required the 
construction of two major dams and a few riverside stations.173 
The  labour  power  and  engineering  expertise  required  for  the  construction  and 
maintenance of each station turned out to be substantial. It was practical to offer suitable 
accommodation near the worksite – and this explains the creation of the DWA’s self-
fashioned ‘Vluytjeskraal town’. By the end of the 1960s, this  construction town had 
become ‘Orania’; at the expense of the government, it transformed into a fully-equipped 
dorp of 483ha exclusively for DWA employees, complete with schools, church, town 
hall, recreational facilities, and a rich surrounding of irrigable land.174
Approximately 200ha of this 483ha was residential area, designated for the contracted 
labour force employed in the region during the 1970s and early 1980s, when the project 
was  at  its  height.  This  area  was  segregated  into  three  residential  components.  ‘The 
people who stayed there lived according to the habit in that time’, according to Orania’s 
resident  historian  and  former  dorpsbestuurder  Manie  Opperman.  ‘The  white  people 
172
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lived in one part; the workers lived away where they weren’t seen’.175 Furthest away 
from the dorp-proper was the Kamponggeriewe, a black location for the project’s black 
migrant  labour  force,  some  of  whom from as  far  away  as  the  Transkei  Bantustan, 
approx. 200 strong; then there was Grootgewaag (‘Risked a Lot’), more of a poor suburb 
than a location, for Orania’s 100 or so Coloured workers, consisting of sixty-four small 
houses  at  an  area  no  greater  than  80ha  or  so,  and  a  small  compound  with  twenty, 
individual  ‘single’s quarters’.  White  engineers and construction team managers lived 
nearby in their own portion of the  dorp, with a roughly equivalent number of houses 
(albeit larger, and more beautified ones).176 
No portion of the entire residential area, from the records available, appears to have been 
alienated and/or offered for sale in this period; people lived there as guests of the DWA 
rather than homeowners, some paid rent and others did not.177 According to a few former 
employees of the DWA, those who did pay rent had approximately R8-10 per month 
deducted from their salaries, though this is about all we know, as no lease agreements or 
contracts survive today.178
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area.  The  Department  of  Water  Affairs  often  encouraged producers  to  settle  on  the 
irrigable land nearby – which would in the mid-2000s give VAB a headache over rights 
to land at a milk farm, for which see Chapter 5.
178 Report on Orania, pp. 20-1.
By the early  1980s,  the project  had downsized,  and most  of Orania’s engineers and 
labourers were offered other positions in the DWA nearby projects on the Orange River. 
Many others were retrenched, but stayed in their old houses. Only a small maintenance 
team, a few ‘white families’ and their predominantly Coloured labour force, were given 
salaries  by  the  DWA to  remain  behind  during  these  years;  the  black  location  was 
virtually abandoned, and those of Grootgewaag’s empty houses had attracted squatters – 
a mixture of Coloured and Black families179 – from the nearby region.180 
Between 1984 and 1989, some people came and went, settled or moved on, occupying 
the place as we might expect any community not enjoying recognised title or ownership 
to do; after all, by the letter of the law, not just the residential space, but the entire 483ha 
town (including all improvements), remained the possession of the DWA. Many other 
people,  however,  settled  in  permanently,  raising  children  and burying loved ones  in 
Orania. They had come to stay, and regarded themselves – not the DWA – the rightful 
owners not only of their dwellings, but also, crucially, the land on which these dwellings 
sat. Apparently, ‘officials of the DWA verbally informed them that once the project had 
179
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 It is worth acknowledging that many ‘Black’ individuals, formerly employed by the 
DWA during the 1980s, admit to passing themselves off as ‘Coloured’ for extra benefits 
in Orania, and that many (perhaps even a majority) of the ‘Coloured’ individuals from 
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180 Interview  with  Opperman  (17  March  2011);  Charles  Leonard,  ‘In  Search  of  a 
Homeland’, Sunday Star (17 February 1991), p. 1. See also Report on Orania, p. 18. 
been completed, the residents would be allowed to keep their homes’.181 In the words of 
one of the former residents, ‘Do you really believe that all of us who lived in Orania 
were so stupid to not build our own houses?’182 Unfortunately, these agreements were 
unwritten, and all we know about them come from the testimony of a handful of former 
employees. It does not seem to have been DWA policy with regards to any other of the 
Orange River canalisation settlements of the period, and it seems strange that rent would 
continue to be deducted from salaries in light of any promise of freehold.
By this  period,  only in the optimistic  eyes of rural  producers was the Orange River 
canalisation project anything more than just a pipe dream, and the DWA soon became 
anxious to abandon the entire scheme and cut their losses. Reporting on Orania in 1985, 
A. D. Brown, one of the DWA’s principal engineers, made clear that the project was 
failing. He noted that ‘the township is still in use’, but little else was; he recommended 
that  the  whole  2769ha  originally  required  for  the  Vluytjeskraal  project,  ‘with  the 
exception of the land occupied by the Township Orania, be allowed to revert back to 
private ownership’.183 
Brown’s use of ‘township’ instead of ‘dorp’, and moreover, his insistence that it be left 
undisturbed and only the surrounding land be sold, are key here. His assessment reveals 
how much the settlement had transformed within the space of just a decade, after white 
engineers had left and the bulk of the labour force was made redundant. Orania, in 1985, 
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had become a kind of township itself, home to a poor community, and similar to any 
other underserviced, over-populated township or location dotted across South Africa.184 
Unfortunately, Brown gave no reason why he thought it best to leave ‘Township Orania’ 
for the current inhabitants with their tenure in a kind of limbo on the one hand, while 
recommending the rest become alienated into private lots on the other hand. Perhaps he 
felt obliged to honour the unwritten agreement to which some of the residents would 
later refer. 
In the end, however, it did not matter. Orania had become a financial burden, costing 
more  to  maintain  than  it  was  worth.185 The  DWA  looked  into  making  its  final 
retrenchments of its remaining skilled and manual labourers, and desired to sell the dorp 
as well as the surrounding land. Land was land: this was a quality, irrigable plot on the 
Orange, and it belonged to a market economy in which only gradually were non-whites 
becoming eligible  to  participate,  and  so  kept  a  steady value.  But  Orania  itself  was 
different: the  town  and  its  infrastructure  were  the  only  things  of  any  real  value 
constructed by the DWA that it could get some kind of return on from its Vluytjeskraal 
project, albeit a petty return (Orania had cost R12m to build, and in the late 1980s, run-
down as it was, received a meagre market value of less than one-tenth of this price). 
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185 Eugene Gunning, ‘Wat Orania Regses Kan Kos’, Finansies en Tegniek (22 February 
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Nevertheless, in 1989, it was passed onto the Department of Public Works and Land 
Affairs for disposal.186 
An  entrepreneur  from  Johannesburg  named  Jacques  Pretorius  bought  the  town  in 
September of 1989 for R1,050,000, but his intentions for it are unknown. Within a few 
months however, the costs involved in the refurbishment and maintenance of Orania 
soon became too exorbitant  for  Pretorius,  and he defaulted on his  payments.187 ‘So, 
Professor Carel Boshoff came around’, recalls Opperman, ‘and he assembled a company 
of interested people, with enough money, and they said to Mr. Pretorius, “you can’t raise 
the funds, we will take over your interest, and we will buy the town”’.188 Accordingly, in 
August of 1990, what was supposed to be an empty dorp was bought by the Afrikaner 
intellectual Carel Boshoff III on behalf of Orania Bestuursdienste (Orania Management 
Service, or OBD).
CONFRONTATION AND REMOVAL:
Early in 1991, a number of settlers moved into Orania, and the former residents moved 
out into nearby towns (Hopetown, Lukhoff, Petrusville and Warrenton) – but exactly 
how this transfer took place is a matter of contention.
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A number  of  newspapers  sympathetic  to  the  residents  of  Orania,  including  a  few 
unlikely Afrikaans newspapers, launched investigations into the dorp as soon as Boshoff 
made public his purchase of it. ‘Everyone in the town is panicking about this situation’, 
reported Mariechen Waldner for Rapport: 
In the houses, on the street corners and in the single quarters in which families 
are now staying, this situation is the only subject which everyone speaks about. 
‘Carel Boshoff is going to shoot us’, says a woman who is breastfeeding her 
infant. ‘We are not supposed to say anything about it’, says a sixteen-year-old 
Gertruida Louw, ‘we need to say to Carel Boshoff that we would like to live with 
him in peace in this beautiful birthplace of ours. The television said that this is 
the new South Africa and if the television says so then it is so’. ‘Ha!’, says Mieta 
Rittels, ‘he speaks of Christianity and he says that he is a Christian. How can you 
be a Christian when you are so arrogant?’189
But Boshoff had made his position clear: ‘[I] did not buy a bus with passengers’, he is 
said to have told the community, giving them until 31 March 1991 to vacate their homes 
and leave Orania.190
Residents who have lived at the volkstaat long enough to tell the story recall it somewhat 
differently.  For  example,  Opperman  admits  how ‘there  were  a  number  of  Coloured 
people staying here’ when the first Afrikaners moved in,
189
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but you must remember, those people were not the same people who came to 
Orania in the first instance. There was this break in the middle. There were only 
about ten, or less, Coloured people [employed] here in a skeleton style. And also, 
the person in charge, managing the staff – he is still alive. I contacted him, he 
told me there were very few people here.191
So what actually happened? To find out we must turn to an unpublished (and highly 
elusive) Report,  comprising the accounts of several former residents collected by the 
Commission  on  Restitution  of  Land  Rights  in  2004-5.  Full  of  contradictions,  the 
narrative  offered  by  the  Commission  does  not  always  correlate  with  the  evidence 
provided in the Report. But it does offer an important insight into some of the residents’ 
side of the story, and in the absence of other records, it is all that we have.
Although the Report states that ‘residents only became aware of the sale  after  it had 
taken place’, this claim is difficult to prove (and stands quite contrary to the interviews 
in the newspaper coverage of the early 1990s); indeed, the Report later contradicts itself 
by showing how ‘there are two distinct experiences surrounding their removal’, namely:
One group was informally told of  the sale  and forthcoming eviction.  Houses 
were  secured  for  some  of  them  in  Luckhoff.  Those  who  did  not  secure 
accommodation found accommodation for themselves in towns nearby. Several 
of these remain as DWA employees today.
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Another group were [sic] not informed of the sale and forthcoming evictions. 
They were  removed forcefully  by  the  Orania  settlers.  No arrangements  were 
made for their transportation or accommodation by DWA. Many of these moved 
either to friends and [sic] relatives nearby. Others ended up in Warrenton. Many 
of these were retrenched by the DWA soon after the forced removals.192
Those of the first group appear to have been in the majority. The DWA had been making 
retrenchments and offers to relocate to other DWA sites consistently from the mid-1980s 
– and only a handful, it seems, remained employed by the start of the 1990s. At around 
this time, as the Report itself relays, many residents admit to being told to prepare to 
vacate their houses in 1989, a few months before the first sale, and almost a year before 
the Orania settlers moved in. Those who went to work for the DWA elsewhere in 1984-
89  left  their  houses  behind  them  in  Orania  (though  unfortunately,  many  found 
themselves redundant within a few years).193 Those employees who remained in Orania 
were quickly taken off the salary, and so no longer had any way to pay the rent for their 
dwellings. 
During the period of Pretorius’s ownership (October 1989 – early 1990), this situation 
changed for some residents. Whatever else Pretorius had in mind for Orania, it seems he 
had no intention to make immediate evictions. According to the Report, ‘as a result of 
Mr. Pretorius’s assurances, [these residents] did not seek any reason to seek alternative 
192
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accommodation’.194 A number of dwellings at  Grootgewaag were reputedly leased for 
R80 per month in this period – again, lease agreements and contracts have not surfaced – 
before Pretorius eventually passed the property on to Boshoff.195 
It  has  been  estimated  that  around  500  people  were  living  in  Orania,  mostly  in 
Grootgewaag, towards the end of 1990.196 Without any written rights or deeds, all had 
become squatters – and their days were numbered, with the property changing hands. By 
this  time,  the  DWA had  made  all  their  retrenchments,  and  a  number  of  ‘informal’ 
comments about the future of the township. Potential buyers and interested individuals 
had made inspections of the dorp, which probably alarmed warning bells to inhabitants 
who saw the  visitors  come and  go.  Advertisements  in  the  Government  Gazette and 
newspapers announcing the sale had appeared for some time, and Carel Boshoff himself 
appeared on television over the Christmas period announcing his purchase – but whether 
or not the majority Orania was serviced well enough to receive this media coverage is 
another matter. While some of this community of 500 probably knew about the pending 
transformation  of  Orania  into  an  Afrikaner  volkstaat,  there  remained  a  significant 
portion  of  this  community  in  Orania  at  the  time  who  claimed,  and  later  told  the 
Commission on Restitution of  Land Rights in  the mid-2000s,  that  they were caught 
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unawares  about  the  sale  –  the  other  of  the  ‘distinct  experiences  surrounding  their 
removal’, as the Report puts it. 
Starting in the early months of 1991 – six months after the sale to Boshoff – those who 
remained  behind  faced  a  number  of  frightening  encounters  with  the  newcomers, 
according to a few testimonies. The first significant occurrence took place on a Friday of 
undisclosed date – probably 29 March197 – when ‘a group of white men appeared […] 
armed with guns and accompanied by dogs’. These men ‘told [the residents] that they 
would have to leave in three days’, and then ‘locked the entrance gate to the “coloured 
location” preventing them from going to other areas within Vluykieskraal farm including 
the grocery store’. When dusk fell, the violence escalated: ‘shots were fired throughout 
the nights’, and ‘beatings, pistol whippings and harassment with dogs’ were apparently 
common.198 ‘We were removed in a very painful manner’, writes a former resident of 
Orania, now situated in Hopetown:
It was in the evening of one Friday when Carel Boschoff [sic] and his friends 
came on bakkies [i.e. utility trucks] to order everyone out of the area. They fired 
guns throughout the night […] we were forcefully removed at gunpoint. We did 
not have transport to transport our goods […] we also did not know where to go. 
We lost a lot of our properties because we were not given enough time to pack.199
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According to another former resident, also living in Hopetown:
Some of us tried to resist passively but we had to succumb to the might of their 
guns.  From  Friday  night  these  crazy  people  were  firing  guns  on  the  air 
throughout.  On Saturday night  they became more physical,  assaulting  people 
[…] I remember one guy […] who severely assaulted people on that night. Our 
visitors were also assaulted. There is an old man whose leg was amputated after 
he was assaulted.200
These and all other of the remaining residents who stayed, willingly or unwillingly, well 
beyond their eviction notices, quickly packed only those of their goods that they could 
onto a few inadequate bakkies, and left Orania. Like the other unemployed squatters of 
Orania who left in 1989-90, these individuals had few options. According to the Report:
Many of those who were able to leave Vluykieskraal Farm at this time moved in 
with  relatives  in  surrounding  areas,  in  particular  at  Hopetown.  Some  found 
accommodation  in  shacks  in  nearby  towns.  Others,  particularly  the  black 
residents who did not have houses, are reported to have returned to their homes 
away from the area.201
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to  the  eviction  is  very  interesting.  It  raises  a  lot  of  important  questions  about  the 
experience  –  and  expectancy  –  of  removal,  and  it  suggests  that  the  community  of 
squatters at Orania were not as tight-knit as the Report suggests.
That appears to be the end of the transfer. Orania’s former residents had been resettled, 
and the dorp was now a blank slate upon which a new – and unique – system of property 
relations would later be erected. This development, along with some of the problems and 
implications of the Report, are the subjects of the following chapter.
CONCLUSION:
It is impossible to understand just why the volkstaat idea had so much purchase in the 
1980s without  acknowledging the sheer  doom that  was circulating around Afrikaner 
circles in this period. Apartheid ensured different people were kept apart,  Afrikaners 
were kept in the middle class, and Afrikaans kept as the lingua franca. But the regime 
was on its way out, to be replaced by a ‘multi-racial democracy’ in which whites were to 
become a toothless  minority. For  all  the different  volkstaats conceived  by Afrikaner 
organisations in the face of supposed apocalypse, Boshoff’s modest Orania would prove 
the most successful. 
Orania, alienated by the DWA and placed onto an open market in 1989, was perfect for 
Boshoff’s  volkstaat project,  and  his  Orania  Bestuurdienste moved in  to  acquire  the 
property with this in mind. But the  dorp had residents: Coloured (i.e. non-Afrikaner) 
individuals  considered  unsuitable  by  Boshoff  and  his  intellectual  brethren  for  the 
volkstaat scheme. They had to be removed, just like other groups had been from the 
same piece of land for hundreds of years before this.
It is worth remembering that to hold property in land had always been difficult for non-
settlers along this stretch of Orange River, particularly after it had become part of the 
British domain in 1848, and then shortly afterwards a reservoir for rich, private interests. 
For these reasons should the transfer of Orania’s disenfranchised, unpropertied squatters 
be seen in continuity with a past of unfair upheavals – a past in which the exclusivist 
economics of settler capitalism determined who could live where and how.
The removal of 1989-91 was the result of a private transaction in land, the terms of 
which said nothing of the prior inhabitants. The extent of contradiction in the available 
evidence precludes any neat or complete understanding of what actually took place, but 
it is fair to say that there were a number of different experiences associated with the 
removal – not just two, as the official Report on the removal would contend. Some claim 
to have been tenants, whose several landlords had failed to observe their rights as such. 
Some were clearly squatters, who knowingly moved into dwellings they did not own, 
upon  land  they  had  no  permission  to  enter.  Some  believed  they  were  owed  their 
dwellings by the DWA, and lived in  ignorant  bliss  about  the  temporariness  of  their 
inhabitancy. Some knew that their days were numbered, when the DWA made clear its 
intentions from the mid-1980s, and so moved out of Orania with plenty of time to spare. 
Others either knew nothing of their eviction notices or simply just chose to ignore them, 
and waited to see what would come to them in early 1991. 
The last remnant of Orania’s residents felt cheated: they wanted to stay, and received 
harrowing  treatment  for  remaining  behind.  Carel  Boshoff  III  felt  cheated:  what  he 
thought to be empty property turned out to be a ‘bus with passengers’, and his eviction 
notices went unheeded. Although the newspapers sided with the Coloured community, 
Boshoff’s case was far stronger – and supported by law. By mid-1991, total transfer had 
taken place: Afrikaners had moved into Orania, the former inhabitants had moved out.
5.
THE ORANIAN LAND REGIME
AND ITS CHALLENGES.
INTRODUCTION:
Right from the volkstaat’s conception, the brains behind Orania faced a dilemma. On the 
one hand, they wanted to create a community allotted into private spaces, for individuals 
and their families – a town which functioned much like any other. And on the other 
hand,  in the context  of  a reforming South Africa,  they wanted to  restrict  ownership 
conditions and provide enough power to themselves so that the town would be kept 
white  and Afrikaner  at  all  costs.  This  dilemma,  they hoped,  would be  overcome by 
offering land not as freehold or as leasehold but as shares. 
For this  innovative plan to work,  a unique and unconstrained system of government 
needed to be installed in Orania, which may be summarised as follows. The sale of 
shares  in  Orania  is  managed  by  an  overseeing,  regulatory  entity:  the  Vluytjeskraal  
Andeleblok  Beperk (Vluytjeskraal  Shareblock  Scheme  Ltd,  or  VAB).  Just  about 
everything  else  is  delegated  to  what  I  call  ‘the  Orania  executive’:  comprising  the 
dorpsraad, led by a handpicked dorpsbestuurder, and a board of directors that presides 
over a democratically elected representative council. Strictly speaking, while the VAB 
takes care of the ‘share block’ system, and the Orania executive takes care of the day-to-
day  management  of  the  town  and  a  number  of  strategic  policy  decisions,  both 
components  of  the  Orania  machine  work  together  in  the  interests  of  keeping  the 
volkstaat running smoothly.
In 1995, this unique system was handed a degree of autonomy by the ANC, and was 
given  a  temporary  right  to  operate  under  its  own,  local  ‘transitional  representative 
council’.202 With this decree, Orania was able to liaise with the provincial and municipal 
administrations of the region independently; crucially, it also allowed them to escape a 
number of municipal tax obligations, which they replaced with a more expensive system 
of rates to feed into their own revenue. 
Between  1991  and  2011,  as  I  show in  this  chapter,  both  the  VAB and  the  Orania 
executive  worked  together  to  support  (individual)  interests  in  land  by  protecting  a 
(communal)  system  of  shareholding.  Along  the  way,  however,  they  faced  many 
challenges.  The strategies and regulations adopted by the VAB and the executive, in 
order to keep the town functioning as any other might, are identified below; so too are 
the steps taken to defend the system in the face of challenges from outside interests – 
municipal, provincial and federal administrations, the South African Land Bank, and the 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, among others.
DEVELOPING A LAND REGIME:
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On 17 August 1990, Carel Boshoff III purchased Orania on behalf of the OBD. Full title 
was eventually transferred not to Boshoff personally, nor to the OBD, but to another 
business entity: ‘Vluytjeskraal Pty Ltd’ (also known as the VAB). From very early on, it 
was  this  entity  which oversaw the apportioning of  land into  plots  for  settlement  by 
Afrikaners, according to a framework known in South Africa as the ‘share block’.203 
Share block regulations first  appeared in the  Share Blocks Control Act of 1980 (and 
would be amended four  times before 1989).204 In  many respects,  the regulations  are 
similar to strata title (also known as condominium), developed in the last sixty years or 
so  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the  United  States,  Canada,  Australia  and  elsewhere,  for 
owners  of  apartments  and  plots  on  sub-developments.  The  two  systems  differ 
fundamentally with respect to the kind of title awarded to the purchaser, however. The 
sale  of  a  flat,  for  instance,  where  strata  title/condominium regulations  are  in  place, 
entails something akin to a full freehold transfer to any private interest with enough 
capital to buy that portion of the block. Share block regulations in South Africa, on the 
other hand, allow the company’s board of directors to oversee the sale of shares, and 
potentially discriminate between contending buyers; furthermore, according to the Act, 
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the  share  ‘confers  a  right  to  or  an interest  in  the  use of  immovable  property’ –  an 
ambiguous right that is allowed to fall short of freehold ownership.205 
Before Orania could become the first, systematic share block scheme predicated upon 
exclusionary principles anathema to the ‘new South Africa’, however, the dorp required 
a makeover. Refurbishing dilapidated houses, repairing roads, and connecting Orania to 
clean water and electricity were expensive and stressful undertakings; without outside 
funding, turnover in sales from the first wave of settlers, and considerable contributions 
from volunteers, the volkstaat may well have floundered in the first few months.206 The 
first settlers and executive persevered through this teething stage, however, and began to 
take appropriate steps to give the  dorp a distinctive Afrikaner culture, so that Orania 
would  attract  the  right  kind  of  interest.207 Within  a  couple  of  years,  Orania  was 
respectable enough to receive a much larger, second wave of white, middle-class settlers. 
The  VAB apportioned  the  land  into  separate  plots,  which  were  variously  evaluated 
according to their condition and location, and then offered for interested investors to 
select. Plots were offered to prospective settlers not in freehold or leasehold tenure, but 
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as singular, described shares, according to the share block model. Not just anyone can 
purchase a share in Orania. Before prospectors can register with the VAB and receive 
their  single  share,  they  must  pass  a  strict  examination  process  administered  by  the 
Orania executive, to see whether the prospector agrees with the ‘Orania ideal’. 
The most important of these requirements includes a commitment to the preservation of 
Afrikaans language and Afrikaner culture, and an outright refusal to use cheap, non-
Oranian labour.208 ‘We have to  okay the newcomer’,  confirms John Strydom, public 
relations officer,
which means that we have to have an interview with him, we have to explain to 
him what Orania is all about, and we have to make sure that he understands it 
firstly and that he agrees to that. If we are unhappy – if somebody comes here 
and he is a Scot, and he’s not interested in the Afrikaner culture – we will try and 
convince him that, you know, this is not really your type of thing, why do you 
want to buy here?209
If  all  goes well  in  the interview, the settler  must  provide personal  details  (regarding 
experience with crime, mental health, education, religion and so on), before facing the 
VAB’s  rules,  regulations  and  procedures, deeds  of  association,  and  grondwet 
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209 Interview with John Strydom, Orania (17 March 2011).
(constitution). These are contained in the Aansoek om Verblyf in Orania (Application for 
Residency in Orania).210
Figure 3: Front page of the application form.
The  grondwet  has  nine  clauses.  The  first  three  clauses  convey  Orania’s  cultural 
requirements.
We hereby acknowledge the Holy Trinity, as shown to us in the Bible as the only 
true  God  who  controls  and  regulates  the  fate  of  all  people,  nations  and 
communities and we believe that we can fulfil our obligation to inhabit and to 
labour on the earth by creating a free “Volkstaat” (State for the Nation) in the 
North-Western Cape for the Boer-Afrikaner nation.
We hereby declare to praise the Holy Trinity in our actions, in our daily conduct 
and labours and to strive for the expansion of the Christian Religion. 
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 Aansoek  om Verblyf  in  Orania.  I  am grateful  to  John  Strydom and the  Orania 
volksraad for agreeing to provide with a copy of this document.
We hereby  declare  to  protect,  live  and  promote  at  all  times  the  Afrikaner’s 
language, culture, traditions and to educate our children and to uphold our world 
views and lifestyle in true and faithful acknowledgement to God.
Clauses four and five refer to the economic policy of the dorp. 
We subscribe to the free market system as our economic model which must be 
seen  as  the  ideal  to  strive  for  within  the  context  of  exceptional  economic 
development within Orania.
We declare only to use labour from our own nation and to promote cooperation 
within and outside of Orania.
Clauses six and seven are more complicated, referring to local authority, internal laws, 
and social order. Most interesting here is the supremacy afforded to ‘the jurisdiction of 
the  Vluytjeskraal  Share  Block  Limited  and  its  accredited  representatives’.  The 
Hopetown Police is the option when all others are exhausted; misbehaviour and poor 
conduct, or any kind of dispute between two parties, results in an in-house process – and 
this is the way the executive likes law done. The first phase is mediation, with hearing(s) 
overseen by a mediator accepted by both parties; the second phase is  arbitration, for 
more serious escalations. ‘No legal advisor may assist or represent’ either party at any 
phase of the in-house process. The VAB’s authority stems from the threat of having 
one’s share torn up: should a dispute not be resolved according to the in-house process, 
or if the matter is a repeat offence, the residency in Orania of the signatory is terminated.
Clauses eight and nine list the process required to make amendments to the  grondwet, 
and confirm its position in any issue as ‘the dominating guideline’. That there is no 
mention  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  South  Africa  is  interesting  but  not 
unexpected; Orania is quite explicit about its ambition to play sovereign without actually 
being one.
The largest set of rules is set out not in the  grondwet however but in a separate form 
called ‘guidelines,  regulations and procedures’.  These cover the technical things that 
would concern a small municipality, such as water, electricity, public spaces, roads and 
pathways;  on  top  of  this,  there  are  guidelines  for  corporate  relations,  construction 
projects  and  farming,  and  a  few  laws  quite  unique  to  Orania.  Clause  nineteen,  for 
instance, ‘deems it  an unacceptable practice for unmarried couples to stay together’. 
Lease agreements issued by shareholders ‘make it as clear as possible for the prospective 
resident/tenant to take note of [this rule] and that they know that it is a case of mere 
principle’. If found guilty, ‘his’ share will be revoked, and ‘he will have no choice than 
to move out of his house’. 
Equally interesting are the ‘guidelines, regulations and procedures’ relating to property 
ownership. Settlers are entering into no ordinary property contract, it is affirmed in the 
first clause:
The  inhabitants  need  to  be  fully  aware  of  the  exceptional  terms  which  are 
connected to the finalisation of any buying agreement which is attached to the 
shares  in  relation  to  the  property  in  Orania.  These  terms  are  outlined  in  the 
standard buying agreement and are subject to the regulations in the constitution 
and the utilization agreement. Inhabitants are therefore requested to make sure 
that they fully understand these specific regulations before they agree to buy or 
sell any property.
Clause thirteen goes on:
Prospective shareholders and residents must appear in front of a committee who 
will decide if the candidates may or may not reside in Orania. This committee 
will be elected by the Board of Directors. The children of residents who wish to 
be shareholders must go through the same process of being allowed to have right 
to residence.
New shareholders and new residents must participate in an orientation course 
about  the right  to  reside in  the town during a  time and place  which will  be 
organised by the directing board.
Following these guidelines, the applicant comes to the ‘deeds of association’, which is 
the final section. These read very much like the grondwet’s clauses, though it goes quite 
a bit deeper into communal relations and how to ‘practice good neighbourliness’ – rules 
established in the interests of maintaining a ‘well-ordered society’.
The Aansoek om Verblyf in Orania – an intriguing, seventeen-page document requiring 
the applicant’s signature no less than four times – is a fairly basic contract which, once 
handed over to the VAB, is redeemable for a share. The application process completed, 
the applicant may then settle in Orania. There are a few ways of going about this. One 
way is to buy newly apportioned land. If the share is acquired in this way, ‘and you buy 
the house for, say, R500,000’, states Hanri Maritz, CEO of the local bank, 
[this] goes to the Vluyjteskraal Aandeleblok Scheme, and they use that to work 
on the infrastructure, to exploit more land, do the sewerage, electricity, water 
connections, whatever […] the whole planning for housing and community and 
residential area.211
Buying directly from the VAB was the most common way of receiving a share in the 
early days of Orania. In recent times, however, it has become more common to buy from 
individual shareholders who, for whatever reason, want to part with their interest. ‘If I 
have a share’, so says Maritz, hypothetically again, 
and I sell it, for example, to you, the money you pay goes straight to me, and 
only the transfer cost, which is 3.5%, will go to the Vluyjteskraal Aandeleblok 
Scheme. The rest – if I buy some house for R100,000, and afterwards I sell it for 
R200,000 – then I make R100,000.212
People seem to be buying and selling like this all the time in Orania – which raises a few 
questions about the liveliness of the property market in Orania213 – but one wonders 
about  the  kind  of  assurances  the  investor  receives.  What  exactly  does a  buyer  get, 
beyond voting rights in the dorp? ‘What you buy is the share, and what you get is the 
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212 Interview with Maritz (17 March 2011). 
usage of the land’, according to Maritz.214 ‘You buy a share, and you pay the price, of 
course, for the value of the land. It is similar to a title deed in effect’, Strydom contends, 
but most South African property lawyers would disagree with him.215 The houses of 
Orania,  and  the  hectares  on  which  they  sit,  are  not  owned separately  by  individual 
freeholders, but belong in whole to the VAB, in whose name the title deed for the entire 
483ha is registered at the deeds office in Cape Town. 
A safer way to go about settling in Orania is  tenancy, an option popular among the 
poorer individuals of the dorp (many of them recruited to Orania as labourers), and also 
those unsure about the volkstaat concept. In fact, according to Strydom: 
A lot  of  people  own  property  [i.e.  with  a  share]  and  they  don’t  stay  here 
themselves. So they let that place out. But once again, even the people who move 
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not uncommon for small,  simple (and frankly unflattering) houses to fetch well over 
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in here without [buying] property still have to go through the whole procedure 
that I explained to you earlier.216
Becoming a tenant in Orania may be the only way to live in the dorp without investing 
in a share, but importantly, as Strydom makes clear above, the same application process 
applies. This ensures that the cultural ideal is uniformly enforced across all sections of 
the  community.  Only  short-term  guests,  staying  in  the  dorp’s  designated 
accommodations venues, regardless of their shape, size and colour, are exempt from the 
process; such individuals visit Orania much as international tourists do on temporary 
visas elsewhere in the world, but are expected to leave strictly within three months.217
The strictness of the application process combined with the share tenure system places 
far greater power in the hands of the dorpsraad than that enjoyed by bodies corporate of 
regular apartment blocks under strata/condominium title regulations. Share blocks are 
quite different to those arrangements, in fact; a much better comparison may be drawn to 
a system unique to Israel/Palestine, where Israeli settlers have organised themselves into 
Moshav communes. As in Orania, prospective settlers to the Moshavim are screened and 
later governed intimately by a private company fashioned like a pseudo-state; the only 
significant  difference  between  the  Moshav  system  and  the  Orania  volkstaat model 
however is where ultimate ownership lies: in Israel, full title tends to be vested either in 
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217 Aansoek om Verblyf in Orania (Guidelines, Regulations and Procedures, Sections, 
14.1, 14.2).
the ‘state’ of Israel or the giant, non-profit Jewish National Fund, and not as is the case 
with Orania, in a small private company: the VAB.218
Today, Orania has grown to accommodate around 1000 settlers, with most settled in the 
town itself. There are teachers, merchants, artisans, and retirees among the wealthier part 
of this community, with trade labourers, construction workers, cleaners, farmhands and 
the  unemployed  comprising  the  poorer  part;  along  with  this,  there  is  a  sizeable 
population of young people in the local education system, which grows as surrounding 
families in the northern Cape and the southern Free State learn about the conservative 
program of  all-white  education  in  Orania.  The  economy is  modest,  but  strong:  the 
farming community appended to Orania boasts a bountiful produce of pecan nuts, grain 
and sprouts thanks in large part to the irrigation of the mighty Orange River, while the 
local tourism industry provides a steady trickle of capital into the town as well. 
In order to meet the growing dorp’s needs, revenue has to be raised by the government 
from a number of sources. There have always been a number of outside investors and 
sympathetic donors since before Orania’s purchase in 1991 (though no one in Orania 
wants to say much about this). In more recent years in Orania however, these donations 
no longer  seem to contribute  to  the  dorp’s refurbishment  and upkeep,  but  are  more 
commonly sought for school fundraisers and support for the Orania welfare system (or 
Helpsaamfondsprojek, developed to cater for unemployed, under-skilled white residents 
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recruited especially for Orania).219 Two other main sources of revenue, both tapped into 
by the VAB, keep the dorp functioning as a normal town. One of these is the artificially 
stimulated real estate market, which provides the VAB with a steady source of revenue: 
as made clear by Maritz above, 100% of every first-time transaction, and 3.5% of every 
transaction after that, enter the coffers of the Orania executive. More substantial than 
this is the other source of revenue, which comes from a system of town rates, paid by 
shareholding residents monthly. This ‘levy fund’, as Maritz puts it,
takes  care  of  the  running  cost  for  the  company,  for  the  salaries  for  all  the 
[administrative and executive] people: the board of directors, and the personnel 
[…] also the workers who clean the streets, the people who do the electricity, 
[and those who] see the water is there [and] pump it from the river. There are 
[also] some fees that have to be paid to the electricity supplier, Eskom. All of that 
is  in  a  budget,  and divided between all  residents,  [who] pay a  levy between 
R1,500-2,000 per month.220
This seems like a lot of money to spend on upkeep, but the VAB have an eye on the 
future, and so regard these rates with pragmatism: it is in the company’s best interest to 
see the base value of their land increase, and a functioning town will always be more 
valuable than a dysfunctional one (as the DWA learned the hard way in 1989). On top of 
this, if shareholders are uncomfortable in the  dorp, one suspects that they will be less 
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220 Interview with Maritz (17 March 2011). The term ‘levy fund’ comes from the Share 
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inclined to make improvements to their plots. Equally pragmatic is the VAB’s policy 
toward exactly the kinds of improvements – and indeed, all construction projects – that 
may be undertaken in Orania. In late 2008, the dorpsraad passed some new regulations 
to  ensure  that  all  buildings,  houses  and extensions  are  structurally  sound,  and  built 
according  to  plans  approved  by  special  commissioners  employed  to  monitor  each 
project.221 On top of this, a number of eco-friendly and cheap building techniques are 
encouraged, with materials imported from around the world to assist in this endeavour.222 
Again, this policy is in the best interest of the VAB, who want maximum value from 
their shares and can achieve this end by prohibiting the construction of poorly built and 
visually unappealing properties; importantly though, this policy is also in the interests of 
the settlers, who are encouraged to build for themselves without outside help and often 
need guidance to do so.223
At first glance, Orania operates like any other small town does. But a closer look at the 
mechanics  of  the  land  regime  reveals  a  complex  and,  frankly,  ingenious  system, 
overseen  by  the  Orania  executive  and  the  VAB. This  achievement  was  not  easy.  It 
required a lot of experimentation, investigation and investment, as explained above; it 
also required quick investment from a partner company to repel other interests, along 
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with significant diplomatic skills and canny legal strategies to protect its bestowal of 
partial autonomy, and the entitlement to land, as explored below.
CHALLENGES TO THE LAND REGIME:
The Oranian system of property relations received its first major threat towards the end 
of 2000, during the lead-up to the nation’s local government elections, and in the fairly 
recent wake of the ANC government’s extended project to rename and reconfigure the 
local municipalities.224 To the horror of the Orania executive – who considered their 
transitional  representative  council  an  important  step  in  the  right  direction  towards 
assuring  their  own,  nationally  recognised  municipal  status  –  it  was  decided  at  the 
northern  Cape  provincial  level,  somewhat  out  of  the  blue,  that  the  ‘Orania  TRC 
established by Provincial Proclamation No. 65 of 1995’ would be ‘disestablished’ as of 
11 November 2000.225 
The municipalities were reconfigured in such a way that Orania would now have no 
choice  but  to  be  merged into a  joint  municipal  district  that  included Hopetown and 
Strydenburg (and would later be known as Thembililhe). This was a terrifying prospect 
for the Orania executive. They claimed, perhaps rightly, that inevitably their dorp would 
be  disbanded and neglected  by  the  new administration,  and  that  the wealth  of  their 
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residents would be over-taxed to pay for services delivered not to Orania but to the poor, 
populous (non-white) communities nearby. 
That the municipal elections were scheduled for 5 December left Orania with little room 
to manoeuvre out of this predicament. Legal advice was sought. In October, Orania’s 
lawyer, Anna Maria Laas, delivered an ultimatum to the government, which showed how 
the move to disband the council was contrary to statutory law as well as constitutional 
law. This ultimatum was ignored, and the matter escalated to the Kimberley High Court 
in November. The judge saw Orania’s case favourably: it was ruled that the dorp could 
retain the rights they formerly enjoyed, and ‘continue to exist as an entity for purposes 
of negotiations and litigation as provided in Article 38 of the Constitution of the RSA’ – 
and  the  matter  was  ‘postponed’  until  the  government  could  organise  a  ‘later 
adjudication’.226
The Orania executive, taking full advantage of the national public holiday, held their 
own local elections on 5 December, the same day that the rest of the country participated 
in municipal elections. Orania’s residents voted for their own administration, rather than 
that  of  Thembililhe’s,  and used  the  day to  celebrate the  preservation  of  their  semi-
autonomous, extra-municipal status.
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Today, Orania’s status is still frozen, because no such enquiry into the dorp’s status was 
ever launched. The government’s avoidance of the issue is understandable. Orania is not 
all that important compared to the many other political issues that confront the ANC 
today. But there may also be some good reasons to avoid taking the municipal issue 
further. If an enquiry ever does yield a ‘later adjudication’, one suspects it fairly likely 
that Orania’s legal status would be upheld, in effect giving official sanction to the Orania 
volkstaat template. Orania’s lawyers produced a strong constitutional argument, relying 
mostly upon Section 235’s protection for small, autonomous communities227; on top of 
this, they insisted all along that because of the VAB shareblock system, it was no town 
of landed citizens (who could be taxed) but was instead more like a farm with generous 
visitors (who could not). 
The prospect of several other Oranias mushrooming across the country is something the 
ANC probably wants to avoid; and the ANC does not want to set a precedent that might 
potentially disturb important statutory law and municipal regulations established after 
1994.  Naturally,  the  intellectual  elite  of  the  Orania  movement  are  pleased  with  this 
indecision, knowing all too well that with every year the matter is delayed the stronger 
their claim to autonomy will become. As Manie Opperman puts it,
227
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The government looked at it, and they shelved it. And it is shelved. 20 years now 
[since Orania’s purchase]. Now, we are of the opinion, that if you have a de facto 
situation, and you live for long enough according to certain conditions, then you 
have some right to keep on doing that.  That is not against the interest  of the 
government itself, or of the people, or of the settlements in the greater region.228
The next serious threat to Orania came in the year 2004. When the dorp first came onto 
the market in the late 1980s, some of the farmland formerly owned by the DWA came 
onto the market too – much of which eventually transferred to an independent farmer, on 
full  freehold  tenure.  A dairy  enterprise  was  established  on  this  property,  albeit  a 
somewhat  unsuccessful  one;  by  the  early  2000s,  this  particular  property-holder  had 
begun to default on his/her loan with the South African Land Bank.229 
By this time, the land was bordering the new VAB territory and, in effect, had become 
intimately surrounded by Oranian Afrikaners. The unique situation of the property in 
question  did  not,  however,  prevent  the  Bank  from  re-acquiring  it  from  this  failing 
farmer, which it did in early 2004, advertising the land for sale shortly afterwards. This 
became quite concerning for the Orania executive, because, as was quite likely, the land 
would be passed onto a non-volkstaater, and could then be used for just about anything. 
Their worst fears were realised in 2004, when a private interest with the intention of 
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installing a large-scale, labour-hungry dairy operation on the land, tendered a bid. As 
Lukas Taljaard, founder of Orania’s local bank, director of the VAB between 1994-2004, 
and settler in Orania since 1993, recalls: ‘They [i.e. the bank] just sold it to another guy, 
who want[ed] to do other things here with all the colours of people, and we [didn’t] want 
that’.230 But how would Orania get around the problem, and avoid seeing their  dorp 
frequented by cheap, non-Oranian (i.e. non-Afrikaner) labourers?
It was Taljaard himself who would save the day. Additional to his impressive Oranian 
CV, Taljaard  was  also  the  founder  and director  of  the  Kambrolandskap Koöperatief 
(KK): the main, private land company acquiring land on behalf of Orania. The KK was 
established in 2002, and has expanded Orania’s sphere of influence by 5000ha since this 
time, and continues to grow.231 Three large KK farms extend well beyond the Orania 
dorp into neighbouring municipalities, and a number of others more closely surrounding 
the 483ha dorp have been subdivided and offered as shares, just as the VAB scheme did 
in the early days. 
One of the subdivided KK farms is the one in question – the land upon which, in 2004, a 
multi-coloured dairy enterprise was soon to be built by a non-Oranian. Taljaard, after 
consultation with VAB and the Orania executive,  moved in to resolve the milk-farm 
matter by submitting a higher bid than that already offered (and, it is fair to assume, 
somewhat higher than its market value at the time). Upon receiving the title, Taljaard’s 
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231 These do not enjoy the sharehold/farm-status loophole, and as such, farmers here are 
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KK then proceeded to subdivide it, and advertise it to new settlers – contingent upon 
their  passing the Oranian application process,  of course.  ‘If  that didn’t  happen, then 
Orania might look quite different’, according to an investor in one of KK’s new plots. 
‘Actually Kambro did some good things there’.232 
There  are  now  around  70  small  plots  owned  by  KK  within  expanding  Orania,  in 
sharehold title identical to that offered by the VAB. According to Strydom, ‘We regard 
all of them falling under the Orania idea. And when they draw up contracts, they will 
stipulate in the contract they will […] obey the letter and the spirit [of the Orania idea] – 
of which the most important is that you must promote the culture of the Afrikaner, and 
that one of the main pillars of that is [using one’s] own labour’.233 The Orania executive, 
like Taljaard, is keen to see the KK continue to expand Orania’s borders in this fashion. 
So  long  as  the  surrounding  region’s  propertied  constituents  give  their  consent  to 
becoming subsumed within the town’s jurisdiction, there is little preventing this kind of 
expansion  –  yet  there  is  sure  to  be  a  point  at  which  the  municipal  governments 
concerned will protest against the resultant reduction of their local revenue.  
Probably  the  most  serious  challenge  faced  by  the  Oranian  land  regime  was,  as 
introduced briefly in the chapter before this one, that laid upon it by a community of 
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233 Interview with Strydom (17 March 2011).
claimants supported by the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights. When, at the 
end of winter in 2005, a claim to the entire 483ha region of ‘Vluykieskraal [sic] Farm, 
today known as Oranje [sic]’, was processed and gazetted, the community of Orania was 
caught  completely  off-guard.234 By  the  time  it  came  to  the  attention  of  the  Orania 
executive, in fact, the sixty-day period in which to enquire into the claim details had 
long passed, which meant that,  according to the conventions of the Commission, the 
claimants’ identities, and all information pertaining thereto, were now protected.235
The identity of the claimants was shrouded in secrecy. ‘A coloured community of about 
60 families says it was forced to leave in 1991’, read a report in the Mail and Guardian 
– but the accuracy of the report cannot be guaranteed.236 It is uncertain where this figure 
of sixty families comes from. As for the claimants’ Coloured identity, we cannot be too 
certain about that either; as the official Report into the claim states on more than one 
occasion,  ‘some “coloured labourers” were in fact  black people who had assumed a 
coloured identity’.237 
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At a meeting between Regional Land Claims Commission representatives and a few 
members of Orania in October 2005, the Commissioner of the Free State and Northern 
Cape jurisdiction advised that he was ‘not in the position to indicate to you the number 
of claimants involved’, though it was confirmed that ‘most of them were employees of 
the Department of Water Affairs’.  Contract workers, he told Orania’s representatives, 
could be protected by the Commission just as any other if a ‘right in land’ could be 
argued, as was the case with these claimants.238 Later it was confirmed that the claimants 
were regarded as ‘a community’ in terms of the 1994  Restitution of Land Rights Act, 
which meant that they were considered a ‘group of persons whose rights in land [were] 
derived from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such group’; 
consequently, this community was empowered to show that ‘dispossession […] occurred 
as  a  result  of  a  racially  discriminatory  law  or  practice’.239 And,  according  to  the 
Commissioner, this  kind of  dispossession did take place;  as  he informed the Orania 
representatives,
During or  before the removals took place at  Orania,  people of  different  race 
groups  had  occupied  the  land.  But  they  were  removed in  order  to  create  an 
Afrikaner state. That in itself is a racial practice.240 
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But according to Willie Spies – the attorney of  Afri-Forum and  Freedom Front fame, 
quickly installed by the Orania executive to represent the volkstaat – it is unclear how 
this argument could have been constituted to show that the sale of Orania was itself a 
racist transaction. As he would later write to the Commissioner:
The dispossession (if any) happened as a direct result of changing needs of the 
former owner being the then Department of Water Affairs and the eventual open 
market  sale  in  1991 of  the  entire  property  with  all  improvements  thereon to 
representatives of what later became known as the community of Orania.241
The  former  residents  of  Orania,  interviewed  by  investigators  on  behalf  of  the 
Commission, for their part, argued that ‘the DWA verbally informed them that once the 
project had been completed, [they] would be allowed to keep their homes’, and many 
attested to have been removed forcefully from their homes – as detailed more fully in the 
previous chapter. 
Voorsitter of Orania at the time of the claim, Opperman, recalls his interactions with the 
Commission vividly. He remembers being told, unofficially, that his chances in court 
were slim. Anthropologists, they warned him, would be deployed to discredit Orania’s 
case, and the tables would inevitably be turned against the volkstaat. ‘[I]t is not ordinary 
justice’, he believes. 
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There is a different type of approach. There is a lot of culture involved – different 
things you have to use to prove your case. It is accepted that [the land] is theirs, 
and you must prove it isn’t theirs!242
Whose case would be stronger? The one Spies developed, on behalf  of Orania, was 
good. Spies rejected the claim that the transfer of Orania to Boshoff was racist in and of 
itself; he disputed that the claimants were a ‘community’ in terms of the Act; he argued 
that Commission regulations with respect to the sixty-day period had not been followed; 
and, if all else failed, he had at the ready a number of constitutional arguments to fall 
back  upon.  At  the  core  of  his  argument,  however,  was  an  argument  about  liability. 
Because a government department alienated the land and put it  onto the market, the 
liability for the treatment of the residents/squatters lay, if anywhere, with the sovereign 
state, not with the VAB.243
Quite remarkably, in the end,  the Commission,  seemingly dedicated to  resolving the 
dispute  in  favour  of  the  claimants,  concurred.  The  matter  was  not  referred  to  any 
advocates in the Land Claims Court. Instead it was settled out of court the following 
year. The Republic of South Africa – not Orania – accordingly paid out R2.9 million 
(approx.  $US400,000-725,000  at  the  time)  to  a  community  of  ‘about  20  families’, 
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according to one newspaper, and ‘eighty residents’, according to another – though again, 
we cannot be sure about these numbers; the official report does not make this clear.244 
CONCLUSION:
The Orania volkstaat has been established on land formerly owned by the DWA. It has 
been sequestered and offered to settlers as shares by the VAB. Wholly reliant upon the 
shares of public investors, the VAB nevertheless conducts itself like a classic private 
enterprise, insofar as  it retains the right to decide, as any business might, just which 
portion of the market it will seek contributions from. Herein lies the genius of Orania. 
By  placing  discriminative  restrictions  on  the  terms  of  the  share,  and  individually 
screening  each  investor,  the  VAB has  taken  appropriate  steps  to  ensure  that  Orania 
remains a  volkstaat, and is kept for one ethno-racial group only; in effect, it is using 
corporate convention and those regulations set out in the Share Blocks Control Act to 
secure for the dorp what key legislation – including the Native Land Acts of 1913 and 
1936, the Group Areas Act of 1950, and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 
– did in the dark old days of apartheid. 
This sale and allocation of shares, however, despite several claims to the contrary by 
actual homeowners in the  dorp,  does not confer full property rights onto the buyers. 
Shares, by their very nature, recognise an interest in a company, not one in land. Herein 
lies a significant weakness of Orania. A market bubble – not in land per se but in shares 
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redeemable for usufructuary rights – has been created on the northern tip of the Karoo, 
one which is overseen by a business with minimal (if any) liability should something, in 
the future, go wrong.245 
However, if the recent past is anything to go by, the fact that Orania has successfully 
fended off a number of challenges already suggests that, in the event of some unforeseen 
disaster,  the  Orania  executive  and  the  VAB stand  prepared.  When  their  transitional 
representative council was taken away, they prepared an argument for the Kimberley 
High Court  to  have  it  re-instated.  When a  private,  external  interest  intended to  use 
neighbouring land for an enterprise that was contrary to the volkstaat ideal, a subsidiary 
company  raised  enough  capital  to  move  in  and  outbid  that  interest.  When  the 
Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights,  with incredible  secrecy, supported a 
community of claimants to the entire 483ha of the dorp, the Orania executive with the 
help of their star attorney prepared a powerful defence that deflected liability towards 
the state, making the claim undesirable for the Commission to have come before the 
courts. 
The Oranian land regime remains intact – for the time being. 
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6.
CONCLUSION: 
LAND REGIMES AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ON THE ORANGE RIVER. 
In  the last  several  thousand years,  humankind has endeavoured to  make land a thing 
possessed – a development that has led to much conflict  between peoples.  This local 
history has analysed two different land regimes in a region of South Africa that has been 
contested for over hundreds of years. Like other land regimes developed elsewhere in the 
settler colonial world, Griqua Philippolis and Afrikaner Orania were created over the top 
of other land regimes. Whose land regime was stronger – whose ‘amalgams of custom 
and law’ gave the soundest foundations to these communities – depended on a number of 
factors, as we have seen. 
Taking note of the economic contexts provides one way to explain the rise and fall of 
these  land  regimes.  The  traditionally  hunter-gatherer  San  of  greater  Philippolis  were 
locked out  of colonial  markets  in land and sheep.  They were superseded first  by the 
Griqua, who adopted a mixed economy based upon pastoralism. Then, the San and the 
Griqua  were  both  comprehensively  superseded  by  the  Boers  who  came  to  dominate 
networks of trade and produce in the Transorangia. The titleless residents of Orania also 
faced economic disadvantages. When the unemployed inhabitants of Orania, redundant 
former employees of the Department of Water Affairs, had their homes taken away from 
them, Orania  was shortly  afterwards  converted by its  new owners  into an artificially 
enclosed market system where their labour was of no value. 
Another common determinant in these two narratives is the prevalence of what I call 
rights  talk.  The ways  in  which  claims  to  land  and special  treatment  were  conveyed, 
received, and ultimately prioritised turned out to be crucial for both contests. From early 
on, the outcast Griqua were quite deft at  communicating their grievances to the Cape 
government, which they commonly did with the help of their main organ, the London 
Missionary Society. Eventually, however, white settlers situated along and to the north of 
the Orange River deployed effective rights talk too. Despite their rift into rebellious and 
loyal factions, both kinds of Boer around Philippolis commonly argued for rights to land 
and self-government of their  own, while  at  the same time bringing into disrepute the 
Griqua’s  exclusive  rights  to  those  very  same  entitlements.  These  arguments  were 
consistently impressed upon representatives of the Cape government. They were written 
into  petitions,  printed  into  settler  newspapers,  and  rehearsed  in  meetings  across  the 
Transorangia. And, importantly, these were arguments connected with a strong republican 
movement that had spread into the Transvaal and Natal, and had become a serious matter 
of concern for the colonial administration. Unsurprisingly perhaps, in the period after the 
Great Trek, the talk of settler rights exceeded in volume anything proffered by the Griqua, 
and  certainly  overshadowed  the  San  plight,  which  was  commonly  downplayed  or 
otherwise overlooked as the Orange River Sovereignty, and eventually the Orange Free 
State, came into existence. 
There are immense differences in discursive context between the two case studies, but I 
believe a number of parallels can be drawn here with Orania. At a time when apartheid’s 
end seemed inevitable, right-wing Afrikaners first hatched the volkstaat  idea by arguing 
for the right of their people to self-determination. After almost a decade of existence as a 
modest  volkstaat  in the northern Cape, Orania faced its first threat, when the provincial 
government planned to remove the town’s transitional representative council in line with 
a  nation-wide  program of  municipal  reform.  Of  all  the  communities  affected  by  the 
program – most of them African – it would be Orania that perhaps most fiercely resisted 
it.  When  the  matter  escalated  to  court,  Afrikaner  rights  talk  was  supported  by  the 
constitution. The case was resolved in their favour due to the ‘right of self-determination 
of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage’. A contrast can be 
drawn to the inhabitants of Orania living there before the Afrikaner settlers took over. 
During the removal  period,  they failed to have their  claims acknowledged by anyone 
except  journalists,  who  showed  only  a  temporary  concern  for  their  plight  and  then 
promptly forgot about them once the deed was written up and fell into Boshoff’s hands. 
Before their removal, a number of former employees of the DWA insisted that staff in 
charge of the riverside project told them that they could own their homes outright at the 
resolution of their construction. Others claimed their rights as tenants had been ignored. 
Whether these claims had any foundation or not is irrelevant, because in the end they had 
no influence on the decision to place Orania on the market as an empty dorp. Much later, 
in  2005,  during  the  processing  of  the  land  claim  to  the  region,  the  Commission 
successfully showed a communal ‘right in land’ for the former inhabitants, but Orania 
deflected responsibility by insisting that the Vluytjeskraal Aandeleblok Beperk’s property 
rights were legitimately acquired. Again as before, Orania’s ability to argue strongly for 
their rights worked in their favour. 
Economics and rights talk are important factors to consider in both case studies, but the 
main factor in the rise and fall of land regimes I have tried to stress throughout this thesis 
is the influence of the sovereign order. Let us first take the Griqua example. If, as several 
legal-historical  scholars  have  noted  of  late,  that  layers  of  sovereignty  fell  across 
contested,  colonial  landscapes  before  ultimately  solidifying  into  the  more  singularly 
totalising modern formats we are more acquainted with today, it is perhaps valid to point 
out how this translates to the matter of land rights in Philippolis.246 For complex reasons 
to which perhaps Aboriginal Australians can best relate, the hunter-gatherer San were no 
sovereigns  in  anyone’s  appraisal,  and  their  rights  to  land  were  ignored  by  settler 
colonisers. The Griqua, on the other hand, gauged colonial discourse brilliantly, observant 
to the social change that was taking place around them, and thanks in large part, to the 
influence of LMS preachers. They attempted to become sovereign over Philippolis by 
creating  their  Captaincy  and  emulating  settler/European  styles  of  property,  and  were 
successful: Kok III was identified by the British administration at the Cape Colony as 
‘independent Chief and the proprietor of the territory’, a leader who possessed the power 
to  exercise  his  own  jurisdiction;  his  claim  to  manage  land  rights  in  the  region  was 
therefore, to those with the powers that were, a pretty good one. 
This changed dramatically when a spatter of white trekboere began to solidify into a bona 
fide settler polity. Gradually after this period, to put it bluntly, the colonial administration 
favoured settler  opinion over native opinion.  The short-lived but  aptly named Orange 
River Sovereignty, unsupportive of the Griqua claim after Harry Smith’s reckless advance 
into the interior, soon transformed into a powerful settler state, with all the bureaucratic 
trappings  that  allowed  it to  decide  independently  of  the  Cape  government  which 
indigenous rights to land were to be honoured. Sadly, as is often the case with settler 
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states, the decision reached was that no indigenous rights to land were to exist identically 
alongside settler rights to land in Transorangia. 
What,  then,  does  all  this  tell  us  about  settler  colonialism,  and  South  Africa  more 
specifically? It shows us that a polity which can lay claim to ultimate sovereignty, after 
unravelling the layers and extinguishing all competing claims, can decide whose rights to 
land are valid and whose are invalid. By no means was this situation unique to Griqua 
Philippolis at this moment in history, as other historians of settler colonialism will likely 
agree;  but  might  it  also  ring  true  for  the  Afrikaner  volkstaat?  How  important  was 
sovereignty for Orania?
Of course, by the time the National Party was preparing to make room for democratic 
election  in  the  1990s,  those  ‘layers  of  sovereignty’  definitive  of  the  mid-nineteenth 
century period and earlier  had been well  and truly unpicked from the middle Orange 
River, and it is probably a stretch to mobilise an argument developed for imperial history 
in this modern context. That said, it remains noteworthy how the role of the overseeing 
sovereign entity in Orania after 1994 – the new Republic – was just as crucial as it was 
for Philippolis after 1854. It was, after all, the post-apartheid government and  its legal 
regime which determined, for the most part, how the matter of land rights were to be 
approached in Orania.
National legislation gave Orania its transitional representative council during the period 
of transformation in the first place; and the judiciary, later disallowing provincial plans to 
disband it, found itself in 2005 constitutionally bound to lock this semi-autonomous form 
of government into place indefinitely. This allowed the Orania executive to distance itself 
from neighbouring municipalities and maintain its own land regime. While true that the 
1991  eviction  was  acknowledged  by  the  state’s  Commission  for  Restitution  of  Land 
Rights, interestingly the land rights of those removed were never on the bargaining table. 
The volkstaat was never under any threat as the claim was being processed, and in the end 
financial compensation came not from the Orania executive but the national tax revenue: 
the state took responsibility for this dispossession with a view to preserving, rather than 
nullifying, the Oranian land regime. 
What is perhaps most astonishing to note – particularly when we take into account the 
very  different  ways in  which  restorative  land  rights  convention  has  developed at  the 
common-law level elsewhere in the settler world – is that this 1991 removal was the only 
dispossession recognised by the Commission.247 According to  the  Restitution of  Land 
Rights  Act (1994),  all  claimants  who  insist  that  their  dispossession  (or  that  of  their 
ancestors) took place before 1913 were considered ineligible for compensation (and those 
who failed to submit their claim before the end of 1998 now have no chance to do so).248 
Thus, in the interests of pragmatism, the South African state has, or more correctly had a 
very particular kind of claimant community in mind when it came to the question of land 
rights in the transformation period – a decision not without its consequences. For Orania 
specifically, this has meant that only one claim out of potentially a handful or more was 
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made to the giant riverside farm called ‘Vluytjeskraal’ (and about this reality the Orania 
settlers  are  undoubtedly  delighted).  Today,  considering  South  African  law’s  general 
disregard for common-law Aboriginal title – and, obviously, pending no new statutory 
provision for pre-1913 claimants – Afrikaner rights to property in land at Orania seem 
unlikely to be disputed by outsiders for the time being, and for this, ironically, it has the 
current government to thank.
In Afrikaner Orania as it was for Griqua Philippolis, then, it is the sovereign that says 
which land rights are good and bad. Of course, it is necessary to add that the sovereign’s 
decision is influenced in great part by the varieties of rights talk spoken by all interested 
parties; and the situation I describe is one that only emerges once all the transferring has 
been done, and the dust is settled on the foundational schism (namely, the removal of 
prior inhabitants). That two episodes each defined by destruction and replacement, yet so 
distant from each other in time – one occurring in the mid-nineteenth century and one in 
just the last two decades – can bring us to this conclusion is telling, for it points to the 
resilience of the structures of settler colonialism, and it opens our eyes to the continuities 
of South African history.
Though it remains to be seen which land regime will replace Orania, the formula for such 
a transfer, I contend, may exist right here in this thesis. 
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